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In the spring 2001, the world economy is in a delicate situation. The vigorous growth momentum that
prevailed in the recovery in 1999 and into 2000 is clearly gone. In the second half of 2000, global
growth decelerated rapidly. In contrast to the last downturn of the world economy in 1997/98, the
deceleration originated in the industrial countries, where growth rates were more or less cut in half
compared to the first half of the year and the OECD leading indicator declined rapidly (Figure 1.1).
Major factors behind the slowdown were lagged effects of monetary tightening and the pronounced
and sustained rise in oil prices. It has to be noted, however, that the loss of momentum was sub-
stantially larger than expected by most forecasters, including the AIECE institutes in fall of last year,
although oil prices behaved largely as expected. The deceleration of activity was particularly pro-
nounced in the IT sector, and the substantial weakening of demand for electronics equipment and IT
consumer goods went in tandem with a dramatic decline in the price of tech stocks on a global scale.
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Indications that the global economy is at the brink of recession are, however, not conclusive. In
most countries, business climate and consumer confidence indicators are still at relatively high levels
despite the fact that they have fallen over recent months. This is true even in the United States, where
the deterioration of indicators has been most pronounced, at least as consumer confidence is con-
cerned.The slowdown in economic activity was most pronounced in the United States, where growth nearly
came to a halt towards the end of last year after growth rates of some 5 percent in the first half of the
year. Real GDP growth picked up slightly in the first quarter of 2001 and came in somewhat stronger
than expected, owing not least to weak imports. The Japanese growth performance also deteriorated
substantially, despite a continued strong rise in corporate investment, as exports and private con-
sumption weakened. By comparison, Western European growth held up relatively well, one reason
being that monetary conditions have remained favorable mainly due to the weak euro. However, the
deceleration of output growth was substantial in some Western European countries, too, most im-
portantly in Germany, and leading indicators suggest that there is some significant deceleration of
Western European growth under way.
Economic activity in the emerging market economies has not been unaffected by the deterioration
of the economic environment, although some countries benefited from elevated oil prices. Towards the
end of the year, it became obvious that growth in the regions outside the industrial countries had also
lost momentum. Non-Japanese Asia had been particularly affected as a consequence of their econ-
omies being particularly exposed to the downturn in the global electronics cycle.
Against the background of a slowing global economy, world trade volumes rose at a grossly re-
duced pace in the second half of 2000 and in early 2001. The high annual rate of growth of world trade
in 2000, which is estimated to have been at around 13 percent, was mainly due to an extremely rapid
expansion at the end of 1999 and in the first half of 2000.
In view of recent developments, the AIECE institutes have revised their forecasts for growth in
2001 significantly downwards. The revision was largest for the United States to only 1.7 percent from
3.2 percent expected for this year in fall 2000, but the forecasts for Japan and the European Union
have also been reduced, by 0.9 and 0.6 percent, respectively (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Summary of Forecasts
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Source: AIECE institutes; IRES (2000); own calculations.
As a reaction to the rapid deceleration of growth, the US central bank has aggressively lowered
interest rates by 2 percentage points in only 4 months. This response is judged as being adequate for
the time being and, in combination with the implementation of the first stage of a large-scale tax cut,
expected to lead to a rebound of activity in the second half of the year. The majority of institutes,
however, expects the recovery in the United States to be shallow, with growth in the 2-3 percent
range. Inflation is generally forecast to decline swiftly, although some institutes argue that given a still
high level of capacity utilization at the overall economy level there is risk that inflation will remain at
current levels.
In Japan, the economy is forecast to deliver slow but positive growth this year and the next. The
main challenge for economic policy is to break deflationary expectations. However, traditional
demand side policies have proved to be largely ineffective, and with interest rates at zero and the fiscal
situation critical there seems to be little room to maneuver except to accelerate structural reforms.In Western Europe, growth is forecast by the AIECE institutes to continue at rates slightly above
2.5 percent, which may be around the sustainable rate of output growth.
1 In the euro area, monetary
policy is currently faced with the fact that headline CPI inflation is stubbornly high and that core
inflation is gradually accelerating towards the upper limit of the ECB target range. Notwithstanding,
the majority of AIECE institutes feel that the ECB's policy stance is too tight and expect interest rate
cuts in the near future ranging from 25 to 100 basis points. By contrast, there is more or less agree-
ment with the monetary policy stance in the countries outside EMU. This year, demand in Western
Europe will be supported by fiscal stimulus in a number of countries. In the euro area, tax cuts have
been implemented that amount to around 1 percent of GDP. As there are no counter measures on the
expenditure side, a consolidated budget deficit is expected by the AIECE institutes of 0.8 percent in
relation to GDP. This follows a surplus of 0.3 percent last year, which was, however, heavily in-
fluenced by large one-off revenues. As concerns the medium-term fiscal strategy, many institutes note
that governments will not be able to meet their deficit targets laid down in their latest stability pro-
grams, mainly due to overly optimistic growth assumptions.
Central and Eastern European accession countries are expected to continue robust growth this year
and the next against the background of a relatively mild slowdown in Western Europe and the pro-
jected recovery of the world economy. While current account deficits continue to be high in a number
of countries, an economic crisis like the one in South East Asia in 1997, triggered by massive outflows
of short-term capital, is regarded as improbable given the fact that external deficits were to a very
large degree financed by long-term foreign direct investment.
2 External Environment
2.1 United States
On the Brink of Recession
The downturn in the United States during the second half of 2000 has been much more pronounced
than expected. Real GDP growth slowed down from a pace of more than 5 percent in the first half of
the year to only 1 percent in the final quarter (Figure 2.1). The strong decline in business climate
indicators and, more recently, consumer confidence has led the AIECE institutes to sharply revise
downwards their growth expectations by 1.7 percentage points from 3.2 percent in the fall last year to
1.5 percent in the current survey. Although the majority of institutes puts the probability of the United
States falling into recession at less than 50 percent, many point out that there is a substantial
downward risk. It is also mentioned that the US economy is already in recession if recession is defined
as a period of growth significantly below potential growth ("growth recession").
Recent data have, however, not been consistently on the downside. Most importantly, the first
estimate of real GDP growth in the first quarter of the current year, which came in at a 2 percent
annualized rate, was significantly higher than the average expectation of the ATECE institutes (0.8
percent). While much of the strength came from a positive contribution of foreign trade as imports
declined strongly, some confidence may also be drawn from the fact that the inventory correction
proceeded swiftly and the deterioration of investment growth came to a halt.
The latter fact may be especially important if sustained, as the turnaround of business investment,
which basically stopped growing after several years of double-digit growth, is seen as the main driver
of the slowdown in economic growth by the institutes. Private consumption growth has also moder-
The detailed tables containing the forecasts of the AIECE institutes and comments on the economic situation and
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ated, although it remained relatively well on track given the decline in household wealth over the past
12 months (Figure 2.2). Major factors behind slower investment according to AIECE institutes are the
lagged effects of monetary tightening, less favorable financing conditions due to the slump in equity
prices and an increase in the interest rate spread between corporate debt of differing quality, an inten-
sifying profit squeeze and a growing sentiment of overinvestment and excess capacities, particularly in
IT-related industries, after an exceptionally long period of expansion. Other factors mentioned include
the rise in oil prices and the appreciation of the dollar.
Given the host of factors putting a drag on capital spending, weak investment for the immediate
future seems to be incorporated in most forecasts. Thus, in the event of an early stabilization of
investment the cyclical downturn in the United States could prove to be shorter and less pronounced
than generally forecast. The major downside risk is to be seen in a sudden adjustment of household
spending, which has continued to outpace earnings growth at the start of the year, leading to a further
decline in the savings ratio to around -1 percent. This risk seems not far fetched in the face of the
reduced stock market valuation and reduced tightness in the labor market, although a correction of
consumption behavior is likely to occur rather gradually than suddenly, according to the pattern
observed in the past.
One reason to expect that the current slowdown will not cumulate into a major recession is
monetary policy, which has been eased early and aggressively. According to the AIECE institutes
expectations, short-term interest rates will be lowered further, if only slightly. Actually, the Fed has
done a lot in recent months. The reduction by 2 percentage points is slightly more than a Taylor rule
would suggest under these circumstances, and the level of interest rates is relatively low given the size
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(2001); own calculations.On the fiscal policy side, the probability is high that a substantial part of the 10-year plan for tax
reduction proposed by the Bush administration will be implemented. While fiscal stimulus will be
small in the short term and moderate in the coming fiscal year — tax reductions may amount to some
0.5 percent of GDP — there is the possibility that already the announcement of a tax package will
have a positive impact on consumer confidence and private consumption.
The combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies is deemed an appropriate policy
response by the AIECE institutes in order to get the economy on track again. Inflation risks are
mentioned by only a minority of institutes which point to the persistent tightness in the labor market
and the still relatively high capacity utilization outside manufacturing. In this environment, a quick
return to rates above potential growth rates could soon give rise to inflationary pressures, especially if
the dollar should weaken as is expected by most institutes. Some institutes have also pointed to the
risk that in a phase of downward adjustment of the targeted capital stock, rising liquidity could lead
to another bubble in asset prices. The actual development of inflation since fall has not been
particularly reassuring, with the year-on-year change in consumer prices remaining at slightly below
3.5 percent in the first months of the year despite the reduction in crude oil prices since fall. At the
same time, the core rate has continued to creep upwards (Figure 2.4). Also, the rise in wage costs has
more or less remained at its elevated level. Notwithstanding, the central forecast of the AIECE
institutes is for inflation to slow down significantly over the coming quarters as a reaction to declining
capacity utilization and lower oil prices. On average, CPI inflation is expected to fall to below 2.5
percent by the start of next year.
In general, a recovery is forecast starting in the second half of the current year, but the upturn is
expected to be modest compared to growth in recent years. Real GDP growth in 2002 is forecast to
amount to 2.5 percent. At the same time, many institutes remain confident about long-term growth and
have generally not revised downwards their estimate of the growth rate of potential output, which is
often estimated to be 3.5 percent or slightly less. The beneficial effects of the so-called New Economy,
namely an increase in the underlying rate of productivity growth, are perceived to remain for the time
being. There is, however, also the view that the boom in IT investment might have shifted the pro-
duction possibility frontier outwards, but has left long-run technical progress and output growth
unchanged.
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Q1/99 Q1/00 Q1/01Box 2.1: Japanese Stagnation in the United States?
At first glance there are disturbing similarities in the developments of the US economy in the period
1995-2000 and the Japanese economy in the second half of the eighties (Figure). In both countries,
real GDP was exceptionally strong. It accelerated to rates beyond any reasonable estimate of
potential output: 5-6 percent in the case of Japan in the late eighties and 4-5 percent in the United
States in the recent past. Both economies experienced an exceptional investment boom. The share
of gross private fixed investment in GDP increased from around 14.5 to some 19 percent in real
terms in each country. The boom in the real economy was associated with a tripling of share prices
in Japan as well as in the United States. Other indicators also went in tandem. The current account
in both countries deteriorated by some 3 percent relative to GDP in the respective periods, although
with the difference that Japan remained in surplus while the United States started in deficit already.
And both countries experienced a significant improvement of the fiscal situation and registered a
surplus in the general government financial balance of more than 2 percent in the final year of the
expansion, although the swing in the United States from a deficit of 3.1 percent in 1995 to a surplus
of 2.6 percent in 2000 has been somewhat more pronounced.
While the similarity of developments of some macroeconomic indicators does suggest that in
both countries the economy experienced a pronounced boom in the respective periods under
consideration, it does not allow conclusions on the extent and the nature of cyclical excesses and on
the way such excesses will be corrected. This is because there are also important differences with
respect to the economic developments and economic policies.
Most importantly, it can be argued that there is a difference in the foundations of the boom.
While the Japanese upturn in the late eighties was largely the result of expansionary monetary
policies, the acceleration of US growth in recent years had its foundations in the real economy. It
was based on a pronounced increase in productivity growth which is believed to be at least partially
structural in nature and is associated with theNew Economy.
Another significant difference is monetary policy. In Japan the monetary restriction had been
much more pronounced and over a longer period of time, and the Bank of Japan did not prevent
deflationary expectations from coming about. By contrast, monetary tightening in the United States
had been relatively moderate and the Fed started easing aggressively as soon as it was clear that the
economy had weakened substantially. As financial sector instability is seen as one important factor
behind the Japanese problems, it has to be noted that the Fed is obviously anxious to prevent
disruptions in financial markets. In this context it is important that the banking sector in the United
States seems to be in relatively better shape. The loss in asset valuation can be expected to be
relatively modest in the United States, since the decline in asset prices is likely to be largely con-
fined to share prices. In contrast to the Japanese case, there is no indication of a bubble in property
prices in the United States. And even if banks were to get into trouble as a result of nonperforming
loans, it could be expected that a clean-up will be organized swiftly.
The ultimate reason behind the Japanese malaise seems to be that the structures that prevailed in
the economy and in society in general were not adequate to cope with the changed economic en-
vironment. As a result, structural problems have been recognized late, and response has been slow.
A lack of openmindedness and flexibility is part of the explanation that structural change which is
necessary to increase the growth rate of potential output in Japan is proceeding painfully slowly. By
contrast, flexibility is one strength of the US economic system.
Box 2.1 to be continued10
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2.2 Japan
Renewed Weakness
In Japan, the recovery from the 1998 recession seems to have stalled. GDP Was basically flat in the
second half of 2000 (Figure 2.5). The year-on-year growth rate of industrial production in combination
with business confidence (Figure 2.6) gives a much clearer picture of the cyclical developments in
Japan than quarterly GDP figures, which are notoriously volatile. Exports that had been a main engine
of growth in the first half of 2000 stagnated, reflecting the downturn in the United States and the rest11
Figure 2.5: Japan: Real GDP and Domestic Demand, 1997-2000
Percent"
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aPercentage change over previous quarter at annual rate.
Source: OECD (2001).
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Figure 2.6: Japan: Business Climate and Industrial Production, 1990-2001
Percent
12
I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' ' I
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percentage change over previous year. — t>Tankan survey.
Source: OECD (2001); Bank of Japan (2001).12
of Asia and a strong dependency on the dwindling global IT demand. Household expenditure did not
support growth, as the labor market continued to soften and a growing sense of job insecurity
dampened the propensity to consume. Business investment was the sole source of demand growth,
with IT-related investment having been exceptionally strong.
Since the beginning of the year, signs of a renewed cyclical downturn have continued to occur, as
weak external demand led to a decline in industrial production and corporate sentiment deteriorated.
Declining orders for machinery and equipment suggest that investment has passed its peak. At the
same time, deflationary tendencies have continued (Figure 2.7). Notwithstanding the rise in oil prices
and more recently a devaluation of the yen, consumer price inflation remained in the negative territory
throughout last year and in the first months of 2001. The deflationary forces have recently gained
momentum, as can be seen at the wholesale level where price inflation fell below zero again after a
short interval of positive numbers.
In order to get a more complete picture of the deflationary problem in Japan the development in
asset prices has to be taken into account. The relentless fall of the value of land is still going on, and
land prices on the national level are down by 25 percent since the peak in early 1992. Share prices are
even down by 40 percent from their peak and, after a substantial recovery during 1999, have again
reversed.
With deflation unabated and the stock market in renewed decline, a new sense of crisis seems to
have emerged. As one result, the Bank of Japan first lowered interest rates again in February and sub-
sequently changed its target and switched from the call money interest rate to a quantitative one for
outstanding current account balances at the central bank. In order to achieve the target, which has been
set at 20 percent above the average balance held at the central bank in the preceding months, the Bank
of Japan will increase its purchases of long-term government bonds on the secondary market if
necessary. Stimulus from the monetary side will nevertheless be limited as real interest rates will
remain in the positive territory for the time being. The possibility of large-scale monetization of gov-
ernment debt is remote however, since the stock of government bonds held at the central bank is not
allowed to rise above the outstanding issue of currency.
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While some stimulus from the fiscal side is likely, it will probably be moderate. Any additional
supplementary budget is likely to be relatively small in size given the critical condition of public
finances. Public debt has risen to around 120 percent of GDP during the nineties. The serious situation
of the budget is illustrated in Figure 2.8. The improvement in the general government deficit from
1999 into 2000 to around 6 percent is mainly due to extraordinary tax revenues associated with the
maturing of high-yielding fixed-term postal savings deposits. Comparing the actual structural primary
balance, which stood at nearly 4 percent in 2000, with the sustainable balance, that means the
structural primary balance that would have stabilized the debt-to-GDP ratio, yields the fiscal
correction needed in the current situation to prevent a debt explosion. Calculations using OECD
estimates of potential growth and imputed interest rates show that a fiscal tightening of as much as 7.5
percent of GDP is currently necessary in order to stabilize debt.
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Source: OECD (2000a); own calculations.14
A need for fiscal consolidation and a reorientation of government policies in order to overcome the
long-term stagnation is increasingly acknowledged in the political arena in Japan, and with a
supposedly reform-oriented politician elected as new prime minister a conceptual renewal of policy
might be in the offing. Structural reforms are viewed as being the key to a sustainable recovery by
many AIECE institutes, as they would improve the growth potential of the economy and could
potentially restore confidence, which is crucial in order to revive domestic demand. In this context the
need for a sweeping reconstruction of the financial sector is stressed in particular. It is, however, noted
that reforms could also weaken demand in the short term as a consequence of heavy restructuring and
therefore should be combined with a continuation of expansionary macro policies. While it is un-
animously suggested to have easy monetary policies in the current situation, the institutes'opinions
about the adequate fiscal response are divided. While some argue in favor of additional public demand
in order to prevent the economy from falling into recession, others doubt that fiscal expansion can be
effective in an environment of spiralling government debt (Ricardian situation).
As concerns the short-term outlook, the AIECE institutes expect low, but positive growth of 1 per-
cent this year. This represents a significant downward revision from 1.9 percent expected last fall.
Next year, real GDP is forecast to rise by 1.9 percent.
2.3 Emerging Market Economies
In the Asian emerging market economies, growth in the year 2000 was strong. While domestic
demand strengthened with the economic recovery progressing, exports remained the main engine of
growth for the region. The slowdown in the industrial countries in the latter half of last year, however,
has been clearly felt, as Asian countries—due to their specialization—are particularly affected by the
end of the high-tech boom. Growth rates declined towards the end of the year, and data on exports and
industrial production for the first months of 2001 suggest that economic activity has slowed further.
The weakness in exports is unlikely to be countered by rising domestic demand. In a number of coun-
tries, the effectiveness of monetary policy to stimulate demand is still limited, due to the persistent
weakness of banks and the ongoing process of de-leveraging in the corporate sector. At the same time,
room for fiscal expansion has narrowed, with deficits in many countries still being high and the public
debt having ballooned over the last years. Growth rates in non-Japanese Asia outside China can be
expected to fall significantly—the IMF forecasts output growth in South Korea to fall from 8.8 percent
last year to 3.5 percent this year and in the ASEAN-4 from 5.0 percent last year to around 3.4 percent
this year (Figure 2.9). By contrast, the growth momentum in China seems to be much more robust.
GDP data for the first quarter of 2001 suggest that economic activity has even accelerated over recent
months despite the deteriorating external environment.
The picture in Latin America is mixed. While some countries like Brazil and Chile recovered in
2000 and Mexico continued to grow strongly, the Argentine economy remained in recession as a result
of a weak competitive position of tradable-goods producers and high real interest rates that were
necessary to defend the parity of the peso vis-a-vis the US dollar in the context of the currency board.
The downturn of the US economy has already impacted on Latin America. Especially Mexico and
Chile have been relatively hard hit due to their close ties with the US economy and, thus, economic
activity in these countries has clearly slowed over the past couple of quarters. Other countries,
including Brazil, have been less affected. The growth prospects here critically hinge on further
progress on structural reform and fiscal consolidation, which seem to be a necessary condition for
keeping the inflow of foreign capital at the level required to finance the deficit in the current account
balance and allowing to hold interest rates at a reasonable level.
In Russia, the surprisingly strong recovery from the 1998 crisis was largely due to import sub-
stitution after the devaluation of the rubel and higher energy prices. During 2000, the rubel appreciated
significantly in real terms. Strong rises in real incomes will also lead to stronger import growth. These15
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developments can be expected to continue, and the resulting compression of corporate profits will
dampen investment. At the same time, lower oil prices will reduce export earnings. Last but not least,
the economic environment for a sustained strong growth seems to be still missing, as progress in
structural reforms is still slow. Therefore, GDP growth is expected to slow down to 4 percent in 2001
and 2002.16
3 European Economic Outlook
3.1 Euro Area
Cooling Down of Economic Activity
Production in the euro area moved onto the path of potential output in the course of last year. Thus, a
long period of underutilized capacities in the economy came to an end.
2 After a very strong expansion
until summer 2000, economic activity has slowed down perceptibly (Figure 3.1). In the second half of
last year, real GDP rose at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, a rate that is only slightly higher than
potential output growth. The slower speed of expansion was above all due to a weaker increase in
domestic demand following monetary tightening and the strong rise in oil prices. Private consumption
was especially dampened in the third quarter of last year when the losses in real income resulting from
the oil price surge culminated. In the last quarter of 2000, private consumption strongly recovered, not
only because of falling oil prices but also in reaction to tax measures in some countries. Italy intro-
duced income tax cuts in November, and in the Netherlands purchases were brought forward because
indirect taxes were considerably increased at the beginning of 2001. Gross fixed capital formation
decelerated only slightly in the course of last year. Admittedly, financing conditions deteriorated in the
wake of monetary tightening, and, moreover, sales and profit expectations are less optimistic than in
mid-2000. At the same time, however, according to surveys of the European Commission, capacity
utilization in the manufacturing sector is still substantially above its long-term average.
The export sector of the euro area was able to expand its sales to third countries by a double-digit
number in real terms last year. This performance can be partly attributed to the prosperous economic
situation in the most important sales markets. Especially the deliveries to the United Kingdom, to
Central and Eastern Europe and to Southeast Asia increased strongly. However, exports to the United
States, which had expanded particularly lively until last spring, showed signs of deceleration in the
second half of 2000. Notwithstanding, external demand remained strong until the end of last year due
to continued impulses from the depreciation of the euro. Even though the real effective exchange rate
of the euro has risen since October, it still was 5.6 percent lower at the end of 2000 than one year
before.
Consumer price inflation has remained high until recently. In March 2001, the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) was 2.6 percent higher than one year before. With that the inflation rate has
exceeded the upper bound that the ECB is willing to tolerate in the medium run for more than a year.
Admittedly, the largest part of the acceleration in inflation is due to the rapid rise in energy prices—a
barrel of crude oil costs on a euro basis 40 percent more in 2000 than the year before. But in the
meantime the underlying price trend (the so-called core inflation, i.e., HICP excluding energy, food,
alcohol and tobacco prices) has also crept up. On the one hand, companies in the euro area have
increasingly exhausted the scope for raising prices arising from the strong economic expansion. On the
other hand, the rise in core inflation can be traced back to the indirect effects of the increase in energy
prices. The past months witnessed a strong rise in the consumer goods component of the industrial
price index. This component usually reacts with some delay to changes in the prices of imported inter-
mediate goods. However, there is little evidence for second-round effects so far, as wage increases in
the euro area have remained moderate.
The labor market evolved particularly favorably last year against the background of the strong
upswing. The number of employed persons increased by more than 2 percent according to ECB
estimates, and in March 2001 the unemployment rate (8.4 percent in ILO definition) reached its lowest
level since fall 1991. Since the end of 1997 the unemployment rate has continuously declined by
3 percentage points. Wage moderation has decisively contributed to this positive development.
2 According to OECD estimates, the output gap, which had opened up in the course of the 1993 recession in the euro area,
remained negative until about mid-2000.17
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Outlook: GDP Grows in Line with Potential Output
At present the leading indicators paint an ambiguous picture of the short-term perspectives of the
European economy. The sentiment indicators compiled by the European Commission point to a con-
tinuation of economic expansion at a rapid pace., Consumer confidence has increased recently after
having gone down markedly in the wake of the oil price surge. The recent embellishment is probably
due to the tax relieves that have come into force in several countries at the beginning of the year.
Moreover, confidence in the industrial sector is still high in comparison with its historical average,
even though it has decreased considerably since last summer. However, a number of other leading18
indicators signal an economic slowdown in the coming months. The European purchasing manager
index has dropped significantly following the downturn in the United States. Also, the growth
indicator calculated by Euroframe
3 shows that economic activity will lose some more momentum in
the first half of 2001.
All in all, the leading indicators suggest that the basic trend of economic expansion will remain
moderate (Figure 3.2). However, in the first quarter of 2001, GDP growth was relatively strong. In
particular private households raised their expenditures considerably, since real disposable incomes
increased more rapidly than before, following the tax cuts. In the course of this year, however, the
fiscal stimulus will gradually fade. Then the weakening of economic activity implied by the less
favorable external environment will get the upper hand. The cooling down of economic activity in the
United States will dampen the demand for European products. Moreover, the deliveries to other
regions will increase at a slower pace than before. Economic expansion will be especially dampened in
Southeast Asia and in Latin America by the business trend in the United States.
How will the weakening of the world economy affect the euro area? The institutes on average
forecast that real GDP in the United States will increase by 1.5 percent this year. This can be regarded
more or less as a soft landing. A recession in the United States is not probable, yet it constitutes a risk
for the forecast. Recently, Euroframe (2001), with the help of the NIGEM macro-econometric model,
investigated how strongly the euro area would be affected by a stronger weakening in the United
States in 2001. The growth rate of real GDP in the euro area would be 0.6 percentage points lower
than in the baseline projection if real GDP in the United States turned out 1 percentage point lower
than in the baseline projection. This would be accompanied by a strong depreciation of the US dollar.
According to these estimates, even zero output growth in the United States this year would not entail a
recession in the euro area.
Figure 3.2: Real GDP
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Source: Eurostat (2001); AIECE institutes.
Apart from the Kiel Institute of World Economics (Germany) the following European research institutes participate in
the research network Euroframe: CPB (Netherlands), DIW (Germany), ETLA (Finland), NIESR (United Kingdom),
OFCE (France), PROMETEIA (Italy) and WIFO (Austria). For information on this cooperation, see: http://www.euro-
frame.org.19
Real GDP in the euro area will on average rise by 2.6 percent in 2001, after 3.4 percent the year
before. The slowdown is due to weaker external demand as well as to a slightly slower increase in
domestic demand. After an acceleration at the beginning of this year, resulting from tax cuts, private
households will expand their consumption expenditure at a slower pace in the remainder of 2001.
Gross fixed capital formation will increase by less than last year until late summer. The institutes
expect a faster increase from this fall on when sales and profit expectations will improve in the wake
of the recovery in the United States and of a gradual loosening of monetary policy in Europe. Exports
will considerably lose momentum this year. This is not only due to the cooling down of the world
economy, but also to an appreciation of the euro. The institutes on average assume that the euro will
appreciate by 11 percent against the US dollar in the course of 2001 and reach parity in the fourth
quarter.
In the course of next year economic activity will expand somewhat faster than potential output.
Monetary policy will stimulate economic growth. Private investment will rise somewhat faster in the
wake of the recovery in the world economy. Private consumption will remain robust next year.
Admittedly, tax relief for private households will not reach the magnitude of this year's relief, but
household spending will benefit from falling inflation and the further improvement in labor market
conditions. There will be no impulse from foreign trade next year. The increase in exports will remain
moderate, as the appreciation of the euro will unfold its full effect. All in all, the institutes expect that
real GDP will increase by 2.6 percent in 2002 (Table 3.1).
The increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) will gradually weaken over the
forecast horizon. The institutes expect that the inflation rate will decelerate to below 2 percent in the
fall of 2001 from around 2.5 percent at the beginning of the year. This is due to the decline in crude oil
prices. It is assumed that the oil price will average approximately 25 US dollar per barrel this year and
next year. The core inflation rate will continue to accelerate during the first half of 2001, but decrease
slightly afterwards. This can be traced back to the fact that the monetary overhang that had arisen in
the last two years has already been translated" into higher consumer prices. Meanwhile, the tightening
of monetary policy during last year has contributed to slower monetary growth. Thus, the risk of a
permanent violation of the stability target has diminished. Due to its high level at the beginning of this
year, the inflation rate will average 2.2 percent in 2001. Next year it will amount to 1.7 percent on
average.
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The wage increase in the euro area will remain moderate in the course of this year and in the
coming year, although the institutes expect that real wages will increase faster due to lower inflation.
While they will not exceed the increase in productivity, there will be less stimulus for employment
from this side. In conjunction with the slowdown in economic activity this will lead to a perceptibly
slower employment growth. According to the AIECE institutes' forecasts the unemployment rate will
average 8.4 percent this year. In the course of next year, unemployment will decrease only slightly; the
unemployment rate will average 8.1 percent in 2002.
3.2 Economic Policies
3.2.1 Monetary Policy
In the questionnaire we sent out in preparation for this report, we asked whether the AIECE institutes
approved the current stance of monetary policy either for their own country or for the euro area as a
whole. As was to be expected, there were notable differences between the answers. Quite naturally, for
rapidly growing economies the ECB's interest rates were viewed as too low, even if for the euro area
they were considered appropriate. The majority of institutes, however, thought that the stance of
monetary policy in Europe was too tight, and most also expected rate cuts by the ECB in the near
future, ranging from 25 to 100 basis points from the current level (Figure 3.3). A small group thought
that the ECB would not loosen its policy.
As far as the countries outside EMU are concerned, there was more or less agreement with the
stance of monetary policy in the respective country, one exception being Poland where short-term
interest rates are considered too high, amounting to about 10 percent in real terms.
The answers concerning the appropriateness of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB were very
mixed. Surprisingly or not, there was a slight majority in favor of the current two-pillar strategy,
although some criticisms were made as far as, for example, the communication policy is concerned.
Several institutes thought that a change in the strategy may be suitable in the future but should not be
considered at this early stage. Many institutes favored a shift in the strategy towards the alternative of
inflation targeting, and there were also proposals that the ECB should respond more to cyclical
conditions and follow a policy similar to the Taylor rule.
There has always been a controversy about the stance of monetary policy. This has certainly also
been true for the policy of the ECB. The main reason is that there is not a unique or well-accepted way
to define whether monetary policy is too tight, too loose or just appropriate. This is mainly due to our
lack of understanding how the economy works. There are many theoretical models which have a
similar success in "explaining" reality. Apart from these possible differences, there has been a broad
consensus in the literature that a central bank should keep inflation low and try to smooth fluctuations
of economic activity. Also, most macroeconomists agree that central banks should follow a kind of
pre-announced rule. This idea has also been more or less accepted by many central banks. However,
there is no agreement about the type of rule that should be pursued: What is the appropriate indicator,
what are important variables to be included, and should the rule be simple or complex?
While these questions are not solved—and they may never be—, there have been a few proposals
which get a lot of attention. Most advocates of rules would certainly not say that their particular rule
should be followed strictly and in a mechanistic way. Rules are usually understood as a rough guide,
and if followed, they should prevent the central banks from making "big mistakes," i.e., high inflation
or deflation should be avoided as well as booms or recessions.
Two such rules will be discussed here (Box 3.1). They define a course for the central banks which
is compatible with the targets. For example, according to the Taylor rule there is a money market rate
and according to the McCallum rule there is a growth rate for money which are compatible with the
target for inflation (McCallum 2000). When calculating respective values, we assume that the ECB's
target for the increase of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is 1.5 percent; this rate is
implied in the reference value that the ECB has derived for M3.21
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What does the Taylor rule say about the "appropriate" level of interest rates? Based on the as-
sumption that the output gap, estimated by the OECD, has recently closed, the Taylor interest rate
depends only on the current inflation rate and the deviation of inflation from the target (which can be
taken as 1.5 percent). According to the Taylor rule, the central bank should raise the real interest rate
above the equilibrium level if inflation is above the target. This is the outcome of most macro-
economic models. With an inflation rate of 2.5 percent in the first quarter of this year and an equi-22
Box 3.1: Rules for Gauging the Stance of Monetary Policy
The rules used here vary according to the instrument applied: there is either an interest rate or a monetary aggregate. One
can use the rules to analyze the course of monetary policy, that is, to assess whether the current policy is too expansionary
or too restrictive with respect to the inflation target.
To determine the interest rate i according to the Taylor rule, the parameters of reaction have to be determined, i.e., the
amount of the change in the interest rate in reaction to a deviation of inflation from its target {n-n*) or the output gap
(y*-y). Commonly, the value of these parameters equals 0.5. Furthermore, one needs an estimate of the equilibrium real
interest rate r, which is by no means trivial (Scheide 1998), as well as an estimate for potential output y*, for which there
are several methods leading to often quite different results.
The Taylor rule usually has the following form:
[1] i = n + r + 0.5(7t-n*)-0.5(y*-y).
According to this equation, there is an excessively expansionary course of monetary policy if the actual interest rate is
lower than the rate given by the Taylor rule, i.e., if the central bank lowers interest rates more than "necessary" in order to
stimulate the economy. In this case, there is—given the underlying theory—the risk of an overshooting of the inflation
target.
In the McCallum rule, the monetary aggregate m is used as an instrument where the precise definition of money is left
open.
a According to this rule (monetary targeting) the money growth rate Am * in the quarter t compatible with the
inflation target n * is as follows:
[2] Am;=^'-j(6(vM-vM7) + ^6(>M-yM,).
This rule, too, can be used as a gauge for the course of monetary policy: For example, if the actual growth rate of money
is higher than the rate according to the rule, monetary policy is too expansionary and would lead to higher inflation in the
medium term. It comes close to the concept of a potential-orientated policy which was pursued by the Deutsche
Bundesbank and which is also the basis of the strategy of the European Central Bank.
aAn important requirement is that the monetary aggregate can be controlled with sufficient precision. For the purpose at
hand it is important that the aggregate has a close relationship with the target variable.
librium real rate of 3 percent, the nominal interest rate which is compatible with macroeconomic
stability amounts to 6 percent; if the real equilibrium rate is assumed to be only 2.5 percent, the rate is
also half a percentage point lower (Figure 3.4). Assuming that inflation will decelerate somewhat in
the near future, the Taylor interest rate would decline, too, but it would still be above the current
nominal rate. The current interest rate could be considered appropriate only if the core rate of inflation,
which is slightly lower than 2 percent, is used for the calculation.
If the alternative McCallum rule is considered as a guide, one can conclude that the stance of
monetary policy is about correct in terms of the inflation target. This rule implies that M3 can increase
by about 5 percent per year which is almost exactly the currently observed rate (Figure 3.5). So this
rate is compatible with the ECB's target of price stability, although the reference value is slightly
lower, reflecting a different estimate of trend output and velocity. All in all, the first pillar of the
strategy does not call for a loosening of monetary policy.
As far as the second pillar is concerned, the ECB published projections for inflation and other key
variables in December 2000 (Box 3.2). At that time, the ECB expected real GDP to increase by about
3 percent per year until the end of 2002 if interest rates remained constant. As the ECB still assumes
potential output to grow by 2-2.5 percent a year, this forecast implies a cumulated increase of the out-
put gap by 1.5 percent; this would actually call for a rise of key rates for cyclical reasons. In addition,
inflation is supposed to remain close to the upper limit of tolerated inflation. Recently, however, the
ECB revised its forecast for GDP growth downwards, implying that the output gap will rise only a
little until the end of 2002. But as there have recently been several negative surprises regarding
inflation, the inflation forecast was not changed much. In short, on the basis of the second pillar, i.e.,
the projections by the ECB, interest rate cuts are not likely.23
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Many AIECE institutes have criticized the ECB's strategy because of the use of M3. They pointed
at possible instabilities of money demand and therefore proposed to abandon this orientation. This is
certainly in line with the majority of economists as well as central banks. However, the ECB has
stressed that the behavior of velocity in the euro area has been (maybe surprisingly?) relatively stable
in the past, even after the introduction of the new currency.24
Box 3.2: Publication of the Inflation Forecast
The European Central Bank published its inflation forecast for the first time in December 2000; this is a new
step as far as communication with the public is concerned. With this the central bank has made the second
pillar of its monetary policy strategy more precise, whereas previously the perspectives for inflation were only
more or less vaguely described, but not put in concrete numbers. This had quite often let to irritations in the
public, because the weights of the different factors affecting inflation was not always clear. Also it appeared
that the importance of the various indicators seemed to change.
The projection on the basis of constant interest rates is in line with the procedure of those central banks that
pursue a strategy of inflation targeting; among these is, for example, the Bank of England. The idea of the
publication is that monetary policy becomes more transparent and is also better controlled by the public. This
does not mean, however, that the central bank has to follow such forecasts in a mechanical way when
deciding about key interest rates; this is also not true in the framework of inflation targeting. But the central
bank is under pressure to explain its behavior if, for example, interest rates are not raised in spite of a forecast
overshooting the inflation target. In this way, the publication leads to more discipline of monetary policy,
which is desirable in the context of a rule-like policy. With such an instrument credibility may be enhanced,
so that the risk premium and thus the real interest rate can decline. The publication of forecasts may also be
helpful for those central banks that had allowed too much inflation in the past (which is true for most of the
central banks now pursuing the strategy of inflation targeting and which was also the explicit reason for the
shift to the new strategy), and also for a "young" central bank like the ECB which may not yet have the
reputation it would like to have.
Whether this new instrument of the ECB will have the desired consequences remains to be seen when
monetary policy decisions are made. At present, it is not quite clear what the role of the inflation forecast for
interest rate policy is, i.e., if and how much the ECB will refer to these forecasts. So far the ECB has tried to
play down the importance of the projections somewhat by stressing that these are the only pieces of in-
formation monetary policy will use. However, such a procedure of playing down does not seem appropriate,
because the projections are nothing less but the second pillar of the monetary policy strategy. Every policy
decision in the future will therefore have to refer to the projections, and the ECB will have to explain how the
level of interest rates will help to achieve the inflation target. It may be useful for the ECB to avoid the
impression that it is locked in for too long as a consequence of its published projection or that it will have to
provide more explanations if it does not act according to the projection. As the forecasts may have to be
revised quite quickly because conditions — as the present situation shows — may change rapidly, it would be
desirable if the forecasts were published four times a year instead of only twice a year as it is planned now.
That said, it seems a little peculiar that the ECB assigns a prominent role to money growth, but it
does not use M3 to, for example, forecast inflation. One way to do that would be the so-called P-star
approach. In this model, inflation over time is explained by a liquidity overhang — defined in the
model as the price gap
4 — and by cost factors. This approach implies that in the long run, the price
level is determined by the level of the money stock alone, whereas in the short run, there is no
immediate adjustment of prices to changes in money. The attractive feature of this model is that it is
compatible with almost all macroeconomic theories: On the one hand, there is the assumption of a
certain rigidity of prices, on the other hand, the long-run neutrality of money holds.
Estimating a P-star model only makes sense if both the trend of output and the trend of velocity can
be estimated with some confidence. This seems to be the case for the euro area, as there is not much of
a difference as far as potential output is concerned; and the velocity of money has behaved in a
remarkably stable way in recent years as it followed closely the trend observed in the 1990s. The
estimated model can explain the behavior of inflation in the past 20 years quite well (Box 3.3). This
includes also the recent pickup of inflation which was in part due to the rise of the oil price and the fall
The price gap is the difference between the equilibrium price level, which is determined by the money stock, and the
actual price level. A positive price gap leads (ceteris paribus) to an acceleration of inflation.25
Box 3.3: A P-Star Model for Euroland
The quarterly inflation rate (Ap) — defined as the current change in the HICP — is influenced by a number of
factors. Apart from the lagged endogenous variable the estimate is based on the price gap ipgap) and the
quarterly rates of change in the oil price (petrolp), other raw material prices (rawp), unit labor costs (ulc) and
the effective exchange rate of the euro (exch):
a
[1] Ap, =0.0014+0.54Ap,_3 +0.19Ap,_5 + 0AS pgap,_i + 0.0043 Ap
(4.37) {8.14) (2.92) (5-85) (3-47)





,^ + 0.0\6Arawp,_4 +0.009 Arawp,_6
(419) (231)
The price gap which is determined by the trend of velocity, the growth rate of potential output and by the
money stock, has a relatively large impact on the inflation rate in the following period: If M3 increases by
1 percent, the rate of inflation rises (ceteris paribus) by 0.2 percentage points. While the other variables only
have a transitory impact on inflation — just as the quantity theory suggests —, a permanent change in the
money stock leads to a permanent change in the price level; in other words: the neutrality of money holds
according to the equation. A dynamic simulation shows that the movements of inflation can be described
quite well by the equation (see Figure below).
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aSee Scheide and Trabandt (2000) for a detailed description.
of the euro. But it was also important that money growth accelerated in 1999 and 2000, which implied
that the price gap became positive.
For the forecast of inflation it is important that the price gap has closed in the meantime: First of all,
the price level rose considerably, and second, money growth has slowed down recently. The other
factors (excluding unit labor costs) work in the direction of a slowdown of inflation in the future, too.
3.2.2 Fiscal Policy
The combined budget of euro area countries showed a surplus in 2000 for the first time since the
1960s; in relation to GDP it amounted to 0.3 percent after a deficit of 1.2 percent the year before
(Table 3.2). The debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 68.5 percent last year and thus came closer to the reference26
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Source: Eurostat (2001); AIECE institutes; own calculations and forecasts.
value laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. However, the increase in the budget balance suggests a size
of consolidation that was not really achieved. The improvement in public finances is above all due to
one-off revenues. Some countries obtained receipts from the allocation of mobile phone licenses
(UMTS), which amount to around 1 percent of GDP for the euro area as a whole. Moreover, the high
speed of economic expansion brought about that additional tax revenues were pouring in and that
expenditures related to unemployment could be reduced. If one corrects the budget balance for these
effects, it can be shown that not all governments in the euro area continued their consolidation efforts
last year.
As the concerned governments have not yet planned any consolidation measures it is to be expected
that the euro area as a whole will once more record a considerable budget deficit this year and next
year in spite of a continued increase in production. On the one hand, the receipts from the allocation of
mobile phone licenses will be considerably lower this year and vanish in 2002. On the other hand, the
budget position in the euro area deteriorates because several countries have — in some cases
substantially — cut direct taxes at the beginning of this year. The institutes estimate that the tax cuts
amount to around 1 percent in relation to GDP. This is not compensated by equivalent expenditure
reductions or extra revenue due to economic trends. All in all, the consolidated budget of the euro area
will exhibit a deficit of 0.8 percent in relation to GDP this year. In 2002 it will amount to 0.5 percent
according to the AIECE institutes' projections.
In the year 2000, the majority of countries still did not meet the provisions of the Stability and
Growth Pact. The Pact demands that euro area countries exhibit a balanced budget on average over the
business cycle. Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal will still be away from this target at the
end of the forecast horizon. While the two last-mentioned countries will gradually reduce the deficit,
the three largest economies of the euro area have cut taxes considerably without corresponding ex-
penditure reductions. Admittedly, tax cuts are welcome under efficiency considerations in those coun-
tries with a high tax burden. But they should be accompanied by expenditure restraint in order not to
endanger the medium-term goal of a balanced budget.
In their updated stability programs, governments in Germany, France and Italy seem to mainly rely
on higher trend growth than in the past and expect that this will be sufficient to eliminate budget
deficits (Table 3.3). The growth assumption is particularly optimistic in the case of Italy. The GDP27
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growth rate of 3.1 percent assumed for the years 2001-2004 has not been reached, let alone exceeded
in a single year since the late 1980s. Government projections also seem to be too optimistic in the case
of Germany and France. The institutes in these countries almost unanimously hold the view that gov-
ernments will not be able to meet the deficit targets laid down in their latest stability programs against
the background of a slowing economy.
Yet, there is considerable disagreement between the AIECE institutes on whether the Stability and
Growth Pact is reasonable. While some critics argue that the Pact restrains the stabilization properties
of fiscal policy, other observers praise that it is more flexible than the Maastricht deficit criterion. In
fact, the Stability and Growth Pact — by being oriented towards the medium run — refers to the
structural budget balance whereas the Maastricht Treaty aimed at the headline deficit. The Pact does
not prevent the automatic stabilizers from unfolding their effects and by asking for a large safety
margin with respect to the 3-percent-ceiling, it also gives some room for countercyclical action in the
case of a severe downturn.
Another controversial point concerns the financing of government capital formation. Some
institutes feel that the Pact should allow for deficit finance of public investment, as the benefits of the
latter accrue not only to current but also to future generations. Others, however, argue that tax finance
of public investment is still preferable, because it leads to a smaller reduction in private savings and
thereby entails larger overall capital accumulation. One thing is for sure: The Stability and Growth
Pact does not imply that government investment has to be curtailed in order to achieve the target of a
balanced budget in the medium run. Rather the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the Broad Eco-
nomic Policy Guidelines of the European Union intend that the expenditure structure in the member
countries should be adjusted in favor of public investment.
hi addition, some institutes point to the fiscal burden that will arise from population aging in the
coming decades. According to their view the budgetary target of the Stability and Growth Pact should
be even more ambitious, at least in the next twenty years. Their argument goes as follows: If it were28
not possible for political reasons to move from a pay-as-you-go system to a system of privatized
funded pensions, governments should build up assets by running large budget surpluses in the im-
mediate future as a substitute for private prefunding.
The AIECE institutes were also asked to comment on the need for further fiscal coordination in the
European Union. Two fields can be identified: First, most of the institutes agree that, as regards the
coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policy, there should be no efforts going beyond deficit
ceilings in order to avoid negative spillover effects from massive debt accumulation. As noted above,
however, some controversy exists on whether deficit provisions should aim at a balanced budget or a
deficit-to-GDP ratio equal to the output share of public investment. The majority of institutes argue
that fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument should remain in national responsibility in order to
counteract idiosyncratic shocks. Second, the institutes commented on the need for coordination con-
cerning tax policy. As could be expected, the views differ most on this subject. While some institutes
argue for harmonization as regards capital income and corporate taxation as well as sales taxes in
order to "level the playing field" and in order to avoid a "race to the bottom," others hold the view that
tax competition is a useful device for the reduction of high fiscal burdens in most European countries
in order to improve the resource allocation.
3.2.3 Wage Policies
The labor market situation in the euro area improved significantly in 2000, with unemployment falling
by nearly 1 percentage point to below 9 percent, down from 11.6 percent in 1997. The major factor
behind this was employment which continued to expand briskly in 2000. The number of employees
increased by 2 percent which is the highest rate of employment growth in more than 20 years (Figure
3.6). The high growth rate came on top of two already exceptionally strong years with increases of 1.8
percent in both 1998 and 1999. This strong development cannot be fully explained by the development
of output.
One reason often cited as being a cause of the marked improvement on the labor market is labor
market reforms carried out over recent years. In air countries of the euro area except Ireland labor
market reforms of some significance have been carried out according to the judgement of the AIECE
institutes, and also in most other European countries (Table 3.4). These reforms consisted of measures
that reduced the reservation wage, improved incentives to work and increased the flexibility of the
labor market, for example by increasing the possibilities of fixed-term work contracts or part-time
work. In many countries there was also an increase in active labor market policies such as labor pro-
curement programs or wage subsidies targeted at problem groups. While there is no clear correlation
between the significance of labor market reforms as perceived by the institutes and the performance of
the labor market across countries, most institutes report that the reforms had a positive impact on
employment, partly through a dampening impact on wage growth.
Wage growth in the euro area has been moderate for a number of years. A noticeable wage restraint
in the recent past has been diagnosed by the institutes for all euro area countries, except the Nether-
lands, and a number of other European countries (Table 3.5). While again the correlation between the
degree of wage restraint and the reduction of unemployment is weak, most institutes see wage moder-
ation as one major factor behind the sustained upturn in the labor market.
The final years of the nineties had been characterized by falling inflation which supported real
income growth. By contrast, the last year saw a negative surprise in consumer price inflation. Wages
have until now hardly reacted to the disappointing real wage growth, partly because wage contracts
negotiated under the assumption of less inflation are still in effect. But the AIECE institutes generally
do not expect significantly stronger wage growth in this year's wage round and in 2002. According to
the institutes there is still no evidence in any country that the negative surprise in consumer price
inflation will be translated into higher labor costs; there are no serious attempts reported to shift the29
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burden of higher oil prices and more recently other negative supply shocks from the consumer to the
producer. This represents a major change from wage-setting behavior in earlier decades and improves
the outlook for growth and inflation. One factor supporting the continuation of wage moderation is
fiscal policy which is increasing the disposable incomes by reducing taxes, but the structural reforms
of the labor market might also be part of the explanation.
3.3 Other EU Countries
Economic activity is also expected to slow down in EU countries outside the euro area. In the United
Kingdom, GDP growth is forecast to fall only moderately to 2.4 percent from 3 percent last year. A
considerable loosening of fiscal and monetary policy helps to cushion the dampening effects stemming
from the foot-and-mouth disease and the relatively large exposure to the cooling down in the United
States. In Denmark, output expansion is expected to lose considerable momentum. Last year the
Danish economy grew by 3 percent, mainly driven by buoyant gross fixed capital formation and a
strong export performance. This year, output is projected by the DEC to increase by a mere 1-1 Vi
percent, owing above all to stagnating private investment. The Swedish economy is expected to slow
down from 3.6 percent to around 2 Vi percent this year, mainly due to weaker export growth and less
vigorous private consumption. Sweden ranks among the countries for which the wealth effect
stemming from the equity boom was estimated to be the largest. Thus, it is expected that the decline in
the personal saving rate observed in recent years will be reversed in light of the marked decline in
stock valuations.
Next year, economic activity is expected to pick up in Western Europe outside the euro area. The
acceleration of growth will be sustained by the recovery of the world economy and the lagged effects
of monetary loosening. As output expansion in these countries will be roughly the same on average as
in the euro area, the European Union as a whole will record a growth rate of 2.6 percent in 2002. This
growth rate is in line with potential output growth as estimated by most international organizations.
3.4 Central and Eastern Europe
In the year 2000, the Central and Eastern European accession countries recorded the highest rise in
production since the beginning of the transformation process, with GDP growth of around 4 percent
for this country group.
5 Growth is expected to remain robust in these countries this year and next year
against the background of the relatively mild slowdown in Western Europe and the projected recovery
of the world economy.
However, external shocks constitute the main risk to economic growth in Central and Eastern
Europe. There appears to be little room for stimulating economic policies in the case of a larger down-
turn in the world economy and especially in Western Europe. Inflation rates remain at or near double-
digit levels in many countries so that the priority of monetary policy continues to be to restrain
inflation in order to proceed on the convergence process towards EU levels. So far, European insti-
tutions have insisted that the accession candidates will have to fulfill all Maastricht criteria before
entrance into the euro area. Some observers have objected that the inflation criterion should not be
applied to the Central and Eastern European countries. The AEECE institutes are divided on this
question. Some institutes argue that the accession candidates will have to wait until full inflation
convergence is achieved in order to facilitate the ECB task of maintaining price stability in the euro
area, while other institutes hold the view that the candidates should be allowed early entry and the
target inflation rate of the ECB should be adjusted accordingly. Both groups agree, however, that
The group consists of ten countries, including Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria,
Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.31
inflation rates in accession countries will be higher than in the euro area for a prolonged period of time
for structural reasons. Thus, it would not be sensible for these countries to conduct an overly tight
monetary policy in order to reach a low inflation rate in the short to medium run. An artificially low
inflation rate could not be sustained after entry into the euro area as the common monetary policy
would imply a significant loosening of monetary conditions. As a result, inflation would rapidly in-
crease and remain far above the target level of the ECB.
Current account deficits of between 4 V2 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic to around 5 V2
percent of GDP in Poland are often mentioned as another potential risk for the economic development
in Central and Eastern European countries. However, the vast majority of AIECE institutes do not
consider the external positions to be especially vulnerable in the near future. In the past years the
current account deficits in these countries were almost exclusively financed by long-term foreign
direct investment. This trend is likely to continue in the coming years. Thus, a crisis like the one in
South East Asia in 1997 triggered by massive outflows of short-term capital is improbable in Central
and Eastern Europe.
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Appendix: Forecast Tables and Country Notes by AIECE Institutes
List of countries and institutes
AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE
WIEN Osterreichisches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) 33
BELGIUM - BELGIQUE
BRUXELLES Departement d'Economie Appliquee de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles - DULBEA 35
BRUXELLES Bureau federal du Plan 36
LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, IRES 37
CZECH REPUBLIC - REPUBLICQUE TCHEQUE
PRAHA Center of Conjunctural Studies and Forecasting, Prague 38
DENMARK - DANEMARK
KOBENHAVN Danish Economic Council, DEC 40
FINLAND - FINLANDE
HELSINKI The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) 42
FRANCE
BOULOGNE - BILLANCOURT Bureau d'Information et de Previsions Economiques (BIPE) 44
PARIS Centre d'Observation Economique de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris (COE) 45
PARIS Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques Departement de la Conjoncture (INSEE) 45
PARIS Observatoire Fran?ais des Conjonctures Economiques (O.F.C.E.) 47
PARIS REXECODE 47
GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE
BERLIN Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) 50
ESSEN Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) 51
MUNCHEN IFO - Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung 51
HAMBURG HWWA - Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung 52
KIEL Institut fUr Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel 52
GREECE - GRECE
ATHENS Center of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE) 54
HUNGARY - HONGRIE
BUDAPEST Economic Research Company (GKI Co) 56
BUDAPEST Institute for Economic and Market Research and Informatics KOPINT-DATORG 57
IRELAND - IRLANDE
DUBLIN Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI 58
ITALY - ITALIE
BOLOGNA Association Prometeia 60
MILANO Istituto per la Recerca Sociale (IRS) 62
ROMA Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (ISAE) 62
ROMA Centra Studi CONFINDUSTRIA 63
NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BAS
'S-GRAVENHAGE Centraal Plan Bureau/CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 64
NORWAY - NORVEGE
OSLO Statistics Norway 66
POLAND - POLOGNE
WARSZAWA Foreign Trade Research Institute (IKCHZ) 68
SLOVENIA - SLOVENIE
LJUBLJANA SKEP Economic Outlook and Policy Services. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia 70
SPAIN - ESPAGNE




ZURICH Konjunkturforschungsstelle an der Eidgenbssischen Technischen Hochschule (KOF) 76
UNITED KINGDOM - ROYAUME UNI
LONDON The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) : 79Country: Austria
33
Institute: WIFO
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A USTRIAN ECONOMIC INDICA TORS
Financial bal. / GDP —•—Current account bal. / GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
- Unemployment rate
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.
COMMENT: WIFO
After a growth rate of 3.2% in 2000, spurred by vivid foreign demand, the weaker international
performance (especially in the US) and a continued fiscal tightness will allow Austria's economy to34
expand only moderately. We expect a growth of 2.2% this year and 2.1% next year. For the US we
expect 1% in 2001 and 2% in 2002 and for the EU 2.4% and 1.8%, respectively. Whereas real exports
expanded by around 11 % in 2000, the weaker external development combined with an appreciation of
the euro in 2001 as well as 2002 will only allow an export growth of 6% this year and 5% next year.
Due to the above-mentioned fiscal stance, the use of government consumption expenditures will in
both years be lower than 1%. In Austria, a large part of non-residential investment is done by the
industrial sector which itself is very strongly linked to export performance. So also this category of
investment products is projected to develop below the average of the last years. Investment in con-
struction will suffer from weak public demand and too affluent stocks of residential objects. Private
consumption growth will be lower due to tax hikes which reduce private disposable income.
Due to the weaker overall performance, employment will rise only modestly and the unemployment
rate will remain nearly unchanged. After rising inflation in 2000 we expect a decline to 1.7% in 2001
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Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institutes; if forecasts differ, their maximum range is shown.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.
COMMENTS: DULBEA (April 2001)
Apres une croissance du PIB de 4 % en 2000, on s'attend a une deceleration a 3 % en 2001,
principalement a cause des exportations nettes, et a 2.75 % en 2001.
En effet, on s'attend a un ralentissement des exportations apres la croissance vigoureuse de l'annee
passee suite au freinage de la demande mondiale. Ainsi, l'economie americaine est en train de se
ralentir, les dernieres estimations montrant une croissance du PIB d'uniquement 1.1 % au dernier
trimestre 2000. Les indicateurs preliminaires indiquent une croissance du PLB presque nulle au
premier trimestre 2001.36
Neanmoins, on s'attend en general a une reprise de la croissance americaine en deuxieme partie de
l'annee, les debats portant sur le fait de savoir si le retablissement de l'activite economique va se
manifester deja des le deuxieme trimestre, ou s'il aura lieu uniquement a partir du deuxieme semestre
2001.
Dans ce scenario il y a des incertitudes quant a la capacite de la FED d' intervenir par le biais de la
politique monetaire afin d'eviter une recession. Outre revolution de l'economie americaine, on prevoit'
une faible croissance d'environ 1% pour l'economie japonaise, ce qui est susceptible d'engendrer un
ralentissement de la demande dans les autres economies du Sud-Est asiatique. Cette combinaison
d'elements menera a un ralentissement de l'economie mondiale. Une partie de cet effet pourrait etre
annulee par les bonnes perspectives de croissance qu'on continue de prevoir en Europe qui peuvent
soutenir une partie de la demande pour les exportations beiges. En merne temps, il y a un deuxieme
element qui peut peser sur les exportations beiges et europeennes en general : revolution du taux de
change euro-dollar. En effet, le freinage de l'economie americaine reduira le differentiel de croissance
entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis donne comme la principale explication de la faiblesse continue de
l'euro par rapport au dollar. On peut alors s'attendre a une appreciation de l'euro par rapport au dollar,
ce qui va reduire la competitivite des exportations en provenance de l'UEM.
Mais si la faiblesse de l'euro est plutot due aux effets d'inertie qui font que le dollar garde sa
position de monnaie Internationale alors que l'euro n'a pas encore conquis la sienne, alors la reduction
du differentiel de croissance Etats-Unis—Europe ne va pas necessairement se traduire par une
tendance de l'euro a la hausse.
En tout etat de cause, l'effet de 1'evolution du taux de change euro-dollar sur les exportations beiges
devrait etre limite, vu que la plupart des exportations vont vers les autres pays de l'UEM. II y aura en
meme temps un ralentissement des importations, vu le contexte mondial presente plus haut et le
ralentissement prevu de l'economie beige. Au niveau des composantes domestiques de la demande, la
consommation privee devrait etre stimulee en 2001 par la hausse du revenu disponible des menages.
Ce dernier serait influence positivement par l'augmentation de l'emploi, des salaires, et par la baisse
de l'impot des personnes physiques.
La hausse de la consommation privee sera accompagnee d'une hausse du taux d'epargne des
menages apres la baisse enregistree en 2000. En effet, la hausse des prix petroliers s'est traduite par
une baisse du pouvoir d'achat des menages alors que les depenses de consommation se sont
maintenues a des niveaux eleves sur le fond d'une bonne confiance des consommateurs. Pour financer
ces depenses les menages ont du rabaisser leurs epargne. Cette annee on s'attend a un retablissement
du pouvoir d'achat des menages suite a l'augmentation de leur revenu disponible et a la baisse des prix
petroliers. Les investissements des entreprises devraient connaitre un rythme soutenu suite au degre
eleve d'utilisation des capacites de production dans l'industrie manufacturiere et au fait qu'on s'attend
a une evolution tres favorable de la rentabilite des entreprises.
Bureau Federal du Plan (February-April 2001)
Belgian exports will be hit this year by the deceleration in world economic growth. Even when taking
into account the expected recovery in world trade from the second half of 2001 onwards, growth in
Belgian export markets should significantly ease back (in 2001 as in 2002). Moreover the expected
appreciation of the euro will reduce the price competitiveness of Belgian exports and would lead to
loss of market share over the whole forecasting period. As a result, the positive contribution of
external trade to real economic growth will decline in 2001 and 2002 in comparison to last year.
Nevertheless, domestic demand should remain robust over the 2001-2002 period. Business
investment should benefit from a rise in firms' profitability due to the gain from the terms of trade.
Private consumption will be sustained by substantial growth in household real disposable income as
the expected deceleration in inflation will allow to regain, this year, part of the loss of purchasing37
power in 2000. Furthermore, households' disposable income will also be supported by some personal
tax cuts (mainly in 2002). Although the deterioration in the business cycle will lower the pace of
employment growth, the higher labour intensity, which has been observed during the last three years,
will give rise, both years, to a favorable employment outcome.
All in all, Belgian GDP is expected to decelerate from nearly 4% in 2000 to 2.8% this year and to
2.9% next year; and it will be less export-led than in 2000.
Taking into account these macro-economic forecasts, the 2001 budget, the 2002-2005 fiscal reform,
and including the revenues from the UMTS licences, the general government budget balance is
expected to move from equilibrium in 2000 to a small surplus in 2001 and 2002 (about 0.7% of GDP
in both years).
IRES (March 30, 2001)
With a GDP increase of about 4 percent, the Belgian economy enjoyed very strong growth in 2000,
well above the EU average. As a consequence of the deterioration in the international environment,
economic growth in Belgium is expected, in 2001, to be weaker than it has been last year. However,
GDP growth should remain strong, at about 3 percent, thanks mainly to robust consumption ex-
penditures. In response to declining inflation, vigorous job creations, and reductions in income tax
rates, household real disposable income is expected to increase very rapidly in 2001, by about 3.5 per-
cent. The savings ratio is expected to increase slightly in 2001: whereas consumer confidence remains
quite high, we anticipate that the decline recorded in 2000 will be reversed this year. Against this
backdrop, consumer expenditures are expected to increase by 2.7 percent in 2001, compared to 2.9
percent in 2000. Despite a less favorable outlook for demand, the prospect for investment expenditures
should remain good: the degree of production capacity utilization in industry is high, financial con-
ditions are favorable, and investment in new technologies should be sustained. Accordingly, business
investment should grow by 4.8 percent in 2001, compared to 4.1 percent last year. As a whole,
domestic demand is expected to grow by 2.6 percent, compared to 3.1 percent in 2001. The con-
tribution of net exports to GDP growth should be of about 0.4 percentage points, half its 2000 level. In
2001,total employment is expected to grow by about 1.3 percent, compared to 1.7 percent in 2001. Job
creations will therefore remain vigorous, thanks mainly to continued economic strength, further
reductions in payroll taxes and a reinforcement of active employment policies. Against this
background, unemployment should continue to decline. By the end of 2001, the unemployment rate,
expressed as a percentage of economic active population, should be close to 9 percent, compared to
about 10 percent at the end of 2000. Inflation, as measured by the year-on-year increase in the
consumer price index, should decline from 2.6 percent in 2000 to 1.5 percent in 2001. This inflation
forecast reflects the decline in oil prices and the moderation of wage increases. It is also assumed that
spillover effects from the past increase in energy prices to other prices will be very limited, as it has
been the case so far.38
Country: Czech Republic Institute: CCSF








Change in stocks (contrib. to growth)
Total domestic demand
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
GDP deflator (**)
Consumer prices (consumer price index) (**)
Hourly wages (***)
Employment (1,000 persons)
Unemployment rate (%) (ILO)
Saving rate, households (%)
Public sector financial bal. (% of GDP) (****)
Gross public debt (% of GDP) (****)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Short-term interest rate (3 m.) (%)
Long-term interest rate (10 yr.) (%)




World trade volume (goods)
Oil price (US$/b Brent)
Exchange rate, 1 euro = $
Exchange rate, 1 euro = natl. currency (*****)




















is 1 euro : 38,63
annual growth. — (***) Computed on basis of monthly wage levels










































































1995= 100, volume = average
on basis of EMU definition.
negative value = appreciation,
CZECH ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.39
COMMENT: CCSF
The growth rate achieved by the Czech Republic in 2000 was much more robust than originally
anticipated (even by our own forecast presented at last year's spring session of the AIECE). The
increment of the GDP had reached 3.1% in this year, while industrial production increased by more
than 5%. After a protracted slump, also construction experienced a pronounced boom (with a 5.3%
growth rate). Though retail trade turnover increased less strongly, even its 4.6% growth achieved
in the course of 2000 signals a pronounced upturn in the overall economic situation in the Czech
Republic, mirroring not only an improvement in household incomes, but also in consumer confidence.
To this robust recovery had contributed (among others) mainly the strong conjunctural upswing in
the EU, which had boosted demand not only for final products of Czech provenance, but to a still
greater extent for semiproducts, originating mainly from its engineering and chemical industry. The
fact that the Czech manufacturing industry has become increasingly involved in subcontracting to EU-
based companies has thus proved to be an advantage. But it had also increased the vulnerability of
these industries—and of the country as such—by an eventual deceleration of economic growth in the
EU.
Nevertheless, in 2001 and the more so in 2002, a further acceleration of economic growth is
anticipated in the Czech Republic (to 3.2% and 3.5% increment of its GDP, respectively), as the
present recovery has not yet achieved the growth rates which may be regarded as sustainable in this
country (due to its location and its other comparative advantages). But it is assumed that in the
subsequent two years economic growth will probably be based much less on net exports than on a
further increase in domestic demand. In this, foreign direct investment—whose inflow has already
reached since 1999 nearly 10% of the GDP each year and which probably will be oscillating around
this volume also in the next few years—is expected to play an important role, not only because it will
supplement domestic expenditures on investments, but also because it will contribute to the creation of
new work places and thus also to the increase in consumer demand. And should this inflow be targeted
at greenfield investments, it will also result in"further productivity gains. Thus most of the past ail-
ments of the Czech economy will be left behind.
The soundness of its present recovery is showing up also in the steadiness of the exchange rate of
the koruna (it has become one of the strongest currencies among transition countries) as well as in the
maintenance of an inflation rate which belongs to the lowest reached in such countries. The so-called
"net inflation" amounted merely to 3% in 2000 in spite of the strong increase of prices of imported
energy. It is expected to be kept at this rate (possibly even at a somewhat lower one) in spite of the
decrease in interest rates (which the Czech National Bank had introduced in February 2001 by lower-
ing the discount rate by 1% , the Lombard rate by 150 bpsand the repo-rate by 0.25 bps) and the con-
tinuing strong inflow of FDI and of bank deposits of foreign subjects (which are diluting the money
supply).
On the other hand, this inflow will help to mitigate the impact of the recent increase in the deficits
of the balance of current account and of the trade balance (which reached $2.1 bill, and $3.3 bill.,
respectively, in 2000 and are expected to increase slightly even in 2001) on the balance of payments of
the country. Though the external public debt of the Czech Republic is expected also to increase
somewhat in the coming years (less so because of repeating budgetary deficits, but mainly because of
the need to cover losses the banking sector had incurred in the past), it will still remain far below the
Maastricht limit. So even the overall financial position of the country may be regarded as sustainable.
But. this does not change the fact that rigorous measures will have to be introduced presently, not only
in support of the strengthening of the "fiscal discipline" of the local business community, but also in
order to curtail expenditures in several fields of public spending.40
Country: Denmark Institute: DEC
Date of forecast: Fall 2000 with revisions
GDP (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Private consumption (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Public consumption (bill 1990 dkr, %)
Gross fixed capital formation
of which:
Equipment (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Construction (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Change in stocks (contrib. to growth)
Total domestic demand (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Exports of goods and services (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
Imports of goods and services (bill, 1990 dkr, %)
GDP deflator (%)
Consumer prices (deflator) (%)
Hourly wages (%)
Employment (1,000 persons)
Unemployment rate (natl. def)
Saving rate, households (%)
Public sector financial bal. (% of GDP) (*)
Gross public debt (% of GDP) (*)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Short-term interest rate (3 m.) (%)
Long-term interest rate (all bonds) (%)




World trade volume (goods)
Oil price (US$/b Brent)
Exchange rate, 1 euro = $














(*) EMU definition. — (**) Historical data from the National Account.























































Please note that the enclosed forecast for 2001-02 is based on our forecast made in November 2000.
Some of the figures in 2001 are however updated as
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DANISH ECONOMIC INDICATORS
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Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute; forecast for CPI refers to private consumption deflator.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.41
COMMENT: DEC
Danish economic growth in 2000 was 2.9 percent, which was moderately higher than projected in the
fall of 2000. The increase was driven primarily by substantial increases in residential and business
fixed investments. The hurricane that hit Denmark in December 1999 has been a contributory cause to
this development. Export growth was also very high in 2000 but as growth in import was higher, net
export contributed only modest to the growth in GDP. Development in private consumption has been
very subdued in the last two years. Growth in private consumption was even negative in 2000. Several
indicators point to a continued subdued growth in private consumption in the first months of 2001.
The private consumption growth rate is expected to pick up in the second half of 2001. Our forecast on
growth in private consumption is anyway likely to be very low in 2001. In 2002 and 2003 the burden
of taxation is expected to decrease, and this will have a positive impact on the growth rate of private
consumption. The growth rate in public consumption was modest in 2000 and lower than expected. In
2001 a larger growth in public spending is expected. This year, GDP growth will most probably be
very modest due to the development in private consumption and a low growth rate in net exports and
private investments. Last year, employment increased by 20,000 persons, primarily owing to rising
employment in the private sector. The unemployment rate is therefore still very low at 5.3% on aver-
age. Nevertheless, wage increases have been modest and there seems generally to be no inflationary
pressure. Employment is expected to rise slowly in the period 2001-03.
The surplus in the general government financial balance is expected to increase in the years to
come. This will be caused by a continuing widening of the tax base and a limit to the growth in in-
come transfers due to falling unemployment.
The domestic-market-determined inflation rate is moderate. In the projection period, it is assumed
that the effective Danish exchange rate will strengthen with the euro against the dollar, and wage costs
and fuel prices are expected to grow at a slower pace, causing the inflation rate to decline. However, a
number of uncertainties are associated with the forecast for the inflation rate. In particular, it is
assumed that the increase in hourly wage costs will be lower than historical experience might predict.
This assumption is made on the basis of the structural reforms that have been implemented in the
Danish labour market during the 1990s. If the labour market turns out to be less flexible than anti-
cipated, the result could be a return to a path of relatively higher inflation.42
Country: Finland Institute: ETLA
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Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.43
COMMENT: ETLA
Finnish GDP increased by 5.7 percent last year, thanks to exceptionally strong export growth. GDP
growth is forecast to slow to 4.5 percent this year, as external demand for Finnish exports weakens
considerably. We expect both export and consumption growth to slow next year, leading to a
moderation in GDP growth to 4.1 percent. Industrial production growth will slow to 7.5 percent this
year, moderating further next year to 5.5 percent. The output of private services will increase by 4 per-
cent both this year and next. The output of total services, private and public, typically increases at a
one-percentage point slower pace, since the output of private services generally increases at a faster
pace than that of public services.
The unemployment rate has declined slowly in recent years due to very rapid growth in labor
supply. Last year, the unemployment rate fell by only 0.4 of a percentage point to 9.8 percent. We ex-
pect a faster decline in unemployment this year, with the jobless rate averaging 9.1 percent for the year
as a whole. The unemployment rate will continue to decline next year to a level of 8.4 percent. The
greatest increases in employment will be in the private service sector. The number of industrial jobs,
however, will increase at a slow pace. Within industry, the biggest employment gains will be ex-
perienced in telecommunication equipment manufacturing. Measures aimed at improving working life
and reducing long-term unemployment have reduced the rate of structural unemployment. Further
steps should be taken to reduce structural unemployment. Such measures include various steps aimed
at reducing the gap between labor demand and supply, such as easing income taxation, reducing hiring
costs, increasing the efficacy of vocational training policy as well as improving the flexibility of the
labor market.
Consumer prices rose by 3.4 percent last year. This year, consumer price inflation is forecast to
decline to 2.1 percent. Slower inflation will result primarily from declines in the housing and
transportation price indexes.
The general government fiscal surplus rose considerably last year, mostly due to the improvement
in central government finances. The general government surplus rose to 6.7 percent of GDP, with one-
off revenues accounting for two percentage points of the surplus.
Part of the fiscal surplus should be used to reduce the tax burden on earned income. High taxes
mitigate the decline in unemployment by reducing both labor demand as well as job search. Part of the
surplus could also be used to boost public expenditures, on the condition that careful consideration be
given to the specific spending programs targeted. However, moderation in public expenditure growth
is called for. This requires politicians to prioritize expenditures more clearly. Even after reducing taxes
and increasing expenditures, there will still be room to cut the central government's debt.44
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A positive European environment: Europe is now a closed economy, and the monetary union has
brought exchange rate stability. In 1992 when the US dollar tumbled all European central banks (ex-
cept the Bundesbank, of course) raised interest rates to defend parities. This is over. To the opposite,
we are likely to see monetary easing this time around (75 bps by the end of 2001 in our view).
And this easing will occur in an environment of solid domestic demand in France, and very solid
services sector growth. Consumer confidence is historically high, labour markets are well oriented and
more flexible than in the past. Consumers benefit from tax cuts and also benefit from the ebb of
inflation with the fall in oil prices. Credit conditions remain healthy thanks notably to solid financial
positions from banks. Interest rates are still historically low. Finally, firms need to expand their capital45
stock given the very high capacity utilization rates (back to late 80s levels) and a structural catch-up
process with regard to new technologies.
COE (March 2001)
The French economy will register a growth rate of 2.9% in 2001 and 2.8% in 2002, a continuation of
the pace seen over the past three years. Although it will not avoid the effects of the slowdown in the
US economy during the first half of 2001, suffering in particular from the sharp reduction in export
flows, the French economy should remain relatively robust despite the international slowdown.
Europe will be affected by the slowdown in global demand. However many countries (including
Germany, France, Italy and the UK) have set out on the path of fiscal loosening, which should help to
support domestic demand. The French economy will follow this European trend, with the rebound in
consumer spending compensating for the deterioration in the international environment, while
investment should remain robust as a result of pressures on productive capacity, and thanks to a
recovery in IT spending. The dynamic path of household spending is essentially explained by fiscal
loosening and by the reductions in inflation linked to falling oil prices. In addition, the maintenance of
an impressive rate of new job creation, even if it turns out to be fractionally slower than the dramatic
performance in 2000, should allow France to record a GDP growth rate significantly above Germany.
In 2002 the two main components of domestic demand, consumption and investment, will be a little
less buoyant in France, while in contrast exports should benefit from an improvement in the inter-
national environment. The fizzling out of the effects linked to the reduction in employers' social
security contributions and the move to a shorter working week will put a brake on employment
creation, while companies will feel less of a need to use investment to bolster their productive
capacity. However, after a quasi stagnation in the first half of 2001(and indeed an industrial recession),
a gradual recovery in activity levels should take place in the United States. French exports should thus
accelerate significantly during the course "of 2002, thereby compensating for the moderation in
domestic demand.
INSEE (March 30, 2001)
The year 2000 witnessed the continuation of an upswing phase in France that has already lasted longer
than that of the late 1980s and has been marked by a very steep rise in employment. However, the
salient feature of the economic situation in 2000 was the slowdown in household consumption in
response to the rise in imported inflation. This impact of the higher oil price now seems to be a thing
of the past. At present, the brakes are on a different growth motor, with world demand slowing down
under the impact of the sudden downturn in the American economy.
The year 2001 has begun in France with domestic demand showing signs of considerable strength.
Investment remains brisk against a background of strained productive capacity and still favorable
financing conditions. Household consumption rebounded in the first quarter, this tendency being
facilitated by the recent disinflation. The upturn in consumption in France is likely to be more marked
than in the euro zone as a whole, thanks to an acceleration in household income that is slightly more
pronounced and has begun slightly earlier. This strength of domestic demand should enable French
growth in the first half to be at a rate roughly half a point better than in the euro zone as a whole.
In France, job creation in the second half of 2000 remained at an exceptional level. Most of these
new jobs were in the competitive sector (250,000 creations compared with 95,000 per half-year on
average in 1994—1999), benefiting both from the strength of activity and the short-term impact of the
reduction in working hours. The rise in employment is expected to remain very strong in the first half
of 2001, although weakening somewhat, mainly because of a fading of the impact of the 35-hour
week. The rise in private dependent employment is expected to be 1.4% in the half-year, compared46
with 1.8% and 1.7% in the first half and second half of 2000, respectively. This strong job creation
should enable unemployment to continue to fall. Having been 9.2% in December 2000, the rate is
expected to be down to around 8 1/2% of the labour force at end-June, thus falling below its 1990 low
and reaching a level not seen since 1983.
Against a background of steadily falling unemployment in the past 3 1/2 years, the nominal basic
monthly wage can be expected to accelerate slightly, with the year-on-year rise moving up from 1.6%
in mid-2000 to 2.2% in mid-2001. The implementation of the reduction in working hours, which is in
most cases being accompanied by agreements at company level for wage restraint for a period of 1 to
2 years, no doubt partially explains the delayed nature of this acceleration.
All in all, households' earned income can be expected to remain dynamic in the first half of 2001,
with the buoyancy of the total wage bill still boosted mainly by the employment tendency.
In addition, households are benefiting from the cuts in taxes and social contributions introduced
towards the end of last year: a decline in rates for the lower income-tax brackets, cuts in local taxes,
the elimination of personal vehicle tax. Other cuts are planned for 2001, mainly in the second half of
the year (fall in unemployment insurance contributions as of 1 January, lowering of the income-tax
schedule, so-called "employment bonus" in September).
Moreover, after rising steadily last year to peak at 2.4% in November, inflation fell back to 1.6% in
December 2000, as a result of the lower oil price. In the first half of 2001, the year-on-year consumer
price rise is expected to fluctuate around 1.4%. The stabilization of the oil price at roughly $25/barrel
and the gradual reappreciation of the euro should take some of the force out of imported inflation.
Underlying inflation is expected to remain stable at around 1.3%. Food prices are likely to rise more
strongly (year-on-year rise of close to 4%), driven upwards by the impact of the BSE and foot-and-
mouth crises on meat prices.
The ebbing of inflation in the first half of 2001 should also help to bring about a marked acceler-
ation in the growth of household purchasing power, likely to be around 3.5% in mid-year, ignoring
quarterly fluctuations.
Although growth in household spending seems to have been modest towards the end of last year,
the acceleration in income started to make itself felt on household consumption as early as in the
fourth quarter of 2000. The overall figure in fact masks particularly weak tendencies regarding food
and energy, these traditionally being the most volatile sectors, and at the same time a slight ac-
celeration regarding manufactures and increased momentum for traded services as a whole.
The first half of 2001 is likely to be marked by an intensification of this tendency. Growth in
household consumption of manufactures is liable to pick up to an annualized rate of the order of 6%.
In particular, after declining in the second half of 2000 following the alterations to the rules regarding
model years, car purchases are likely to return to much more rapid growth. Spending on services
should continue to be very brisk, stimulated by the spread of telecommunications services and the
continuous fall in prices in this sector.
The strength of consumption is likely to be accompanied by a continuing high saving ratio, as is
normal at times of a sustained acceleration in income.
Against a background of continuing firm overall demand, productive investment should continue
its strong progress. Housing investment, for its part, is likely to slow down, given the impact on
purchases of the rise in house prices and the slight hardening of financing conditions. Moreover, part
of the slowdown would be attributable to the completion of the repair work connected with the sales at
the end of 1999. Finally, investment in public works can also be expected to slow down, following the
great dynamism shown in the second half of 2000 (which was marked by the run-up to the municipal
elections).
In contrast to the acceleration in domestic demand, the slowdown at world level is likely to hold
back demand in French export markets. This would mean a marked slowdown in exports in the first
half of 2001, despite continuing firm demand from certain European trading partners. The annual47
growth rate for manufacturing exports is expected to be halved from one half-year to the next, i.e.
from 12% to 7%. In addition, food exports can be expected to decline under the impact of the BSE and
foot-and-mouth crises. As exports have a high import content, imports too can be expected to slow
down, but to a smaller extent, given the strength of domestic demand. The external contribution to
growth would be negative for the half-year, by slightly less than half a point in annualized terms.
All things considered, the marked slowdown in external demand would be offset by an acceleration
in domestic demand, with French growth amounting to 3% in the first half of 2001.
However, this strength in activity would mask differing situations in the main sectors of activity.
The building and public works sector, whose strength underpinned growth in 1999 and 2000, is
expected to slow down. The manufacturing industry is likely to do so as well, but still maintaining a
solid growth rate, of the order of 3.5%. Distribution and services are likely to be very buoyant.
O.F.C.E. (March 2001)
French GDP is expected to rise by 3.0 per cent this year and by 3.3 per cent in 2002. This is similar to
the GDP growth rates in recent years, after a period of slow growth in the first half of the 1990s:
output rose by 1.1 per cent a year between 1990 and 1996 and by 3.2 per cent between 1997 and 2000.
The unemployment rate fell from 12.4 per cent in 1997 to 9.7 per cent in 2000. Job creation broke
records in 2000 with a net increase of 580 000 in employment. Albeit slowing down, job creation will
remain strong in 2001 and 2002 (between 400 000 and 500 000); the unemployment rate will drop to
7.6 per cent by the end of 2002, i.e. the level of the early 1980s.
In 2000, the rise in oil prices had some effect on French GDP and inflation. It cost 0.5 per cent of
growth, and inflation did not accelerate as wage increases remained moderate and temporary cuts in
oil taxes were introduced. As in 2000, the external environment will not threaten French growth in
2001 since the latter is mainly driven by domestic demand, especially consumer spending and private
investment. High employment growth boosts disposable income and consumer confidence. Strong
domestic demand also stimulates private investment, since capacity utilisation has reached historically
high levels, with current rather low production capacities after years of poor investment in the 1990s.
The level of corporate returns and investment opportunities in ICTs also contribute to the growth of
private investment.
Falls in unemployment are partly the consequence of the measures implemented on the labour
market. The youth employment scheme, offering 5-year jobs in the public sector to people under 25,
has reduced the particularly high rate of unemployment among young employees. The introduction of
the 35-hour working week has also had a positive effect on employment. It has been financed by
productivity gains (through increased flexibility), wage moderation, and reductions in employers'
social contributions. As a consequence, the strong upswing in hourly wages did not boost inflation.
French inflation is among the lowest in the European Union. The unemployment rate is still high and
keeps pressure on wages. In 2001 and 2002, wages are forecast to accelerate slightly, but inflation will
remain under control thanks to productivity gains and tax cuts. The rise in households' real disposable
income will keep on stimulating demand despite a stabilisation of the saving ratio.
The virtuous circle of self-fed strong domestic demand is expected to last in France in the two years
to come. Fiscal policy will be neutral. Public spending will remain under control, but within the tax
cuts decided, and largely introduced in 2000, some are to come into effect in 2001 or 2002 (they will
amount to 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2001 and 0.5 per cent in 2002, after 1.1 per cent in 2000).
REXECODE (April 11, 2001)
Au cours de l'annee 2000, la croissance du PIB en France s'est rapprochee de sa tendance de long
terme en s'inscrivant sur un rythme compris entre 2,4 et 2,8 %. La croissance franchise ne differe pas48
de celle de la zone euro apres l'avoir depassee lors des deux annees precedentes. Le resultat de l'annee
2000 s'explique par une faiblesse de la consommation des menages qui n'a ete que partiellement
compensee par un investissement toujours vigoureux. En raison d'une deterioration de
l'environnement mondial, la croissance se modererait a 2,6 % en 2001 et en 2002. En profil trimestriel
toutefois, la croissance s'inflechirait au premier semestre 2001 avant d'accelerer progressivement pour
ressortir a 3 % a la fin de l'annee 2002.
Les exportations ont ete particulierement vigoureuses tout au long de l'annee 2000 mais elles se
modereraient des le premier trimestre 2001 en raison du ralentissement du commerce mondial et du
redressement de l'euro. La progression des importations en volume serait a nouveau superieure a celle
des exportations en 2001 et 2002. En effet, en depit du ralentissement de la croissance debut 2001, le
desserrement des contraintes pesant sur le niveau de l'offre ne s'opererait que lentement. Les
difficultes de recrutement risquent meme de se tendre au cours des deux prochaines annees avec le
durcissement des regies d'application de la loi sur les 35 heures. Ces contraintes pourraient a nouveau
peser sur le niveau de l'activite et nourrir ainsi les importations face a une demande interieure encore
vigoureuse.
La demande interieure hors stocks s'inscrirait sur une tendance de l'ordre de 2,7 % en 2001 et 2002
apres 3 % en 2000. A la faveur d'un ralentissement de l'inflation et des reductions d'impots, la
consommation des menages accelererait a 2,6 % en 2001 et 2,8 % en 2002 en rupture par rapport a la
tendance qu'elle a connue en 2000. La consommation serait egalement soutenue par une acceleration
des salaires liee d'une part au durcissement des tensions sur le marche du travail et, d'autre part, a
l'expiration des accords de moderation salariale conclus dans le cadre du passage aux 35 heures dans
les entreprises de plus de 20 salaries. Cette avance viendrait ainsi nourrir les gains de pouvoir d'achat
du revenu des menages et ce en depit d'une moindre progression de l'emploi salarie marchand.
L'investissement des entreprises se modererait en debut d'annee tout en conservant une progression
tres superieure a sa moyenne de long terme. Les tensions sur les equipements demeurent vives dans
l'industrie et la construction notamment et nourrissent une demande vigoureuse de biens d'equipement
en grande partie satisfaite par des importations. Mais la deterioration de l'environnement mondial
viendrait peser sur l'investissement. De meme les determinants financiers de 1'investissement tendent
a se noircir avec la faible progression de l'autofinancement, l'alourdissement de l'endettement et
1'orientation a la hausse du cout reel du credit.
Le ralentissement de la croissance a 2,6 % en 2001 viendrait peser sur l'equilibre des comptes
publics. De plus, de nombreuses incertitudes demeurent sur les conditions de financement des
reductions de charges consecutives a la mise en ceuvre des 35 heures alors que dans le meme temps les
depenses de sante manifestent des signes de forte acceleration. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif d'un deficit
public equivalent a 1 % du PIB en 2001 et a 0,6 % en 2002 apparait difficile a atteindre, ce qui
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COMMENTS: DIW (March 2001)
The economic upswing in Germany lost momentum since mid-2000 and capacity utilization, still on a
high level, was somewhat reduced. In the first months of this year, the number of unemployed persons
was only slightly reduced. In spite of the considerable downward trend of oil prices, inflation in March
was still 2.5%, i.e., still about at the same level as in late summer 2000, when the oil price was at its
high. The direct and indirect effects of the oil price increase needed more time to work through than
was supposed some months ago. But what was more important, administrative price increases and the
consequences of BSE contributed much to the high level of inflation.
The slowing down of the world economy till now did not affect German exports to a large extent.
But imports increased faster in the second half of 2000.
Most important was the slowing down of domestic demand. Especially private consumption grew
only slowly, and the growth of investment in equipment came down, too. Construction activity was
even negative. On the whole, there was no further progress in the process of adaptation of the east
German economy to the west German economy.
In 2001, especially in the first half of the year, dampening effects on the German economy will
come from the weak expansion of the world economy. Export dynamics will be reduced. With the
recovery of the US economy in the second half of this year and higher imports of the oil-producing
countries, export growth in Germany will recover to a certain extent.
Fiscal policy is supporting demand. The tax reform this year gives a stimulus in the order of 1% of
GDP and reduces the tax burden of enterprises and private households. Next year fiscal policy will be
slightly restrictive again.
Monetary policy is not stimulating. The probable reduction of the key interest rate by the ECB will
come too late to compensate for the negative demand effects.
Wage policy is still moderate. Effective hourly wages in the year 2001 will increase by a little bit
less than 2 Vi% and a little bit more than 2
 lA% in 2002. Unit wage costs will increase slightly more
than this year. On the whole , there will be no pressure on prices from the wage side.
The growth trend in Germany will continue and the economy will recover in the later course of the
year. Less export dynamics this year will—at least partly—be compensated by higher domestic
demand. Monetary policy will become more expansive, having its main positive effects in 2002.
Foreign demand will benefit from the recovery of the world economy. But there will be no further
stimulus from fiscal policy. Thus in both years, GDP growth will only slightly exceed 2 %. With lower
growth in both years, unemployment will be reduced only slowly. Inflation will come down in the next
quarters of the year as oil price effects are running out.51
RWI (March 2001)
hi 2000, the recovery of the German economy continued. The upswing gained further momentum
during the first half of the year, but slowed down afterwards, mainly due to the strong rise of the oil
price. Demand for exports received strong impulses from the lively expansion of the world economy
and was further supported by the continuous weakness of the euro. As a consequence, investment in
equipment recovered strongly, also strengthened by some supply side factors (tax reform, decrease of
unit labour costs and low real interest rates). Domestic demand as a whole, however, grew less than
expected for two reasons: Private consumption suffered from the high oil price and investment in
construction shrank further in view of the still high surplus built up after reunification. In addition,
public expenditure remained weak. Employment increased strikingly; however, the expansion by
nearly 600 000 is partly due to statistical revisions, now taking marginal part-time workers fully into
account. At the same time, unemployment (ILO) decreased to an unemployment rate of 9.2%. In-
flation remained moderate (1.9%), with half of the increase due to the rise of energy prices.
All in all, the international environment has worsened compared to last year. World trade will lose
some of its momentum (2001: 8 Vi%; 2002: 7 %) and the euro will revalue slightly against the US
dollar. The crude oil price is expected to stay at about 25 $/barrel.
IFO (End of March 2001)
In Germany real GDP rose by 3% in 2000. This was the highest growth rate since the unification
boom in the early nineties. Exports were the main driving force, propelled by very favourable world
economic conditions and the significant devaluation of the euro vis-a-vis the US dollar. Falling unit
labour costs also contributed to the strong export drive—exports of goods (and services) grew
approximately in line with world trade (ca. 13%). Since imports rose by roughly 10%, the external
balance contributed a full percentage point to output growth. Gross fixed capital formation continued
to grow rather moderately (+ 2.4%), but the discrepancy between investment in plant and equipment
(+ 9%) and investment in construction (-2.5%) remained considerable. The very weak performance of
the construction sector—on-going since 1995—was mainly due to the continuing strong recession of
this sector in east Germany; the development in the construction sector in west Germany was virtually
stagnant. The expansion of private consumption came almost to a halt in the second semester due to
the impact of much higher prices for energy. Consumer prices (HCPI) accelerated and rose by 2.1% on
average. Employment picked up by 1.6%, while the unemployment rate (EUROSTAT) dropped by 0.5
percentage points against 1999 to 8.1%. The deficit of the current balance widened to 1.2% of GDP
due to worse terms of trade.
The buoyant upswing, which started in mid-1999, came to an end in the course of the second
semester 2000—as was indicated by the "Ifo Index" of the business climate, though order inflows and
production in the industrial sector grew further. The main reasons were the oil price shock and the
monetary tightening in the USA and the euro area.
Economic policy can be expected to stimulate the economy in 2001 but might be more or less
neutral in 2002. The main contribution comes from fiscal policy thanks to the "tax reform 2000"
which contains tax cuts for private households and enterprises in the order of 1.1% of GDP. In 2002
fiscal policy is likely to be somewhat restrictive. But, with the European Central Bank starting to
lower its key rate in the summer half year 2001, this will be more than compensated by stimulating
effects from monetary policy. In the course of 2001/2002 a moderate revaluation of the euro vis-a-vis
the US dollar is expected.
The slowdown of economic growth will continue well into the current year, as is also indicated by
the "Ifo business climate index". Worsened world economic conditions and the dwindling effects of
the euro devaluation are the main reasons. In addition the tightening of monetary policy until fall 200052
will be felt more and more. The beginning of the next upswing can be expected in late spring next
year, triggered by an improving international environment, and led by the upswing in the USA. In the
course of 2002 economic growth will gain further momentum.
In 2001 real GDP is expected to grow in the order of 2%. The expansion of exports in the first
place, but also of gross fixed capital investment (the recession in the construction sector will continue)
and of public consumption will slow down, while private consumption is likely to pick up somewhat
due to the tax reform. The impact of slower growth will be felt on the labour market. Employment will
grow only in the order of 0.9%, and the unemployment rate will drop less than the year before. Due to
the persisting increase of prices for energy and food also in the second quarter (and a gradual slow-
down during the second half-year) consumer prices will rise by more than 2% on average. The deficit
of the current balance is likely to rise to ca. 1.5% of GDP.
In 2002 a general improvement of the economic situation is expected: Real GDP might grow by
roughly 2.2%—which means an acceleration from the second quarter onwards—with exports and
gross fixed capital formation gaining momentum and private consumption growing by slightly more
than 2%. The improvement of the labour market will be about the same as in 2001. Consumer prices
are likely to continue rising more slowly well into 2002; the level will be about 1.5% higher than
2001. The deficit of the current balance is likely to decline as well as the general government financial
balance.
HWWA (March 21, 2001)
Economic expansion, unsustainably strong until last summer, slowed considerably in Germany since
then, with dampening effects from monetary policy as well as—temporarily—faster rising prices
being the main factors behind the slowdown. Weaker world demand meanwhile showed hardly up in
exports yet. Nevertheless the external contribution to growth was slightly negative as imports soared
(with the deflator of imports in national accounts having risen much less than that of unit values of
goods, the increase of imports may be somewhat exaggerated, however).
Internal demand will rise significantly faster again in the first half of 200las a result of reductions in
income tax at the beginning of this year; next year fiscal policy will be neutral again. The effects of
fiscal impulses waning this summer will be partly offset by a deceleration in price increases. The
strong rise in food prices is expected to be but temporary; further, with lower oil prices and some
revaluation of the euro, the terms of trade are improving. The prospective return into the stability
range as well the slow monetary expansion is expected to cause the ECB to lower the repo rate by half
a percentage point shortly. Monetary policy then will be about neutral for Germany; the same applies
to monetary conditions with the euro assumed to revalue slightly in the forecast period. In the later
part of the year and in 2002 external demand will be stronger again partly due to a recovery in the US.
On the whole GDP will rise less this year and next than it did in 2000. But increases by about 2.3
to 2.4% will correspond roughly to potential growth. Comprehensive structural measures to foster
potential growth aside from lowering taxes, e.g. in the labour market, are not projected. Employment
will increase, though more moderately than last year, and unemployment will continue to fall, but
moderately. The inflation rate (year on year) will sink below the mark of 2 % in the later part of the
year, as the temporary forces driving inflation will abate. Further we assume that wage moderation
will continue. Uncertainty on this, however, has grown somewhat during recent weeks as the climate
between the bargaining partners cooled off.
KIEL (March 2001)
In 2000, the German economy grew with the highest rate since reunification. The main reasons were
the hitherto expansive orientation of monetary policy and the very favorable economic environment in53
the world economy. Helped by the strong decline of the real exchange rate of the euro, German
exports grew at record pace. However, while exports expanded strongly until the end of the year,
domestic demand growth was dampened in the second half of 2000 by the increase in oil prices and
the tightening of monetary policy. Real GDP increased only by an annual rate of 1 percent in the
course of the second half of the year, following 4.4 percent in the first half. Private consumption was
restrained by the adverse impact of higher consumer price inflation on real disposable income. The
dynamics of investment in machinery and equipment also lost some of its momentum, but remained
headed upwards supported by some frontloading of investment projects in order to escape the
tightening of depreciation rules that went into effect at the start of the year.
In the first half of 2001, economic growth will benefit from the reduction in personal income tax
rates that came into force in January. Tax cuts amount to 1.1 percent of GDP and are only partly offset
by slower growth in expenditures and lower depreciation allowances. Moreover, there are positive
impulses from falling capital market interest rates and lower energy costs. We therefore expect a
temporary increase in the growth rate of aggregate production in the first quarter. Following this tax-
related acceleration, the economy will slow down starting from the second quarter. As the world
economy loses momentum and the euro appreciates, export growth will decline sharply. However, the
economy will not move into recession since domestic demand will remain robust. As monetary policy
is expansionary this year and neutral next year, investment will continue to grow. Private households
will expand expenditures as real disposable income continues to increase as employment continues to
grow, although at a slower pace than in 2000, wages rise at a slightly higher pace, and consumer price
inflation is reduced. The gradual recovery of the world economy that we expect to start in the second
half of 2001 will more and more support growth in the course of next year. All in all, we expect real
GDP to expand by 2.1 percent in 2001 and by 2.2 percent in 2002. Consumer prices will rise by
2.2 percent and 1.5 percent this year and next year, respectively. The unemployment rate will fall from
9.2 percent in 2000 to 8.1 percent in 2002.54
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COMMENT: KEPE
Macroeconomic conditions have improved remarkably, in Greece, during recent years. Since 1997, the
Greek economy has returned to a firm growth path with GDP growth rates above EU average. Eco-
nomic growth, which averaged 3.1% during the 1996-99 period, accelerated in 2000, reaching 4.0 per
cent. Activity was led by robust domestic demand with investment spending being the principal55
contributing factor. The growth rate is expected to increase somewhat in the current year, reaching
4.2 per cent.
The average annual inflation rate, which was reduced by nearly 6 percentage points in the 1996-99
period to a rate of 2.5% in 1999, rose again in 2000 as a consequence of higher world oil prices, looser
monetary conditions and exchange rate depreciation. The average increase in the private consumption
deflator was 2.9% in 2000. The twelve-month average CPI is currently running at 3.2% and core
inflation is also rising in part due to the unwinding of indirect tax cut effects, which were part of the
anti-inflation policies of previous years.
Government efforts to contain inflation pressures are expected to be relatively successful, as wage
settlements have remained moderate. Increased competition in goods and services markets should also
play a role in strengthening anti-inflation policies. However, higher inflation remains the major risk,
both in relation to the weakness of fiscal plans but also to the possible short-run effects of monetary
easing. Also, a threat of cost inflation cannot be entirely ruled out given the combination of a wage
drift in certain sectors and catch-up clauses in the present wage agreements.
Central bank intervention rates converted to Eurozone levels at the end of 2000. Long-term
government bond rates have also declined accordingly, although, in comparison to German bonds, a
difference of 0.5 percentage points persists. Commercial bank lending rates, on the other hand, are still
1-3 percentage points higher than those in the euro area, despite a decline of around 3.4 percentage
points.
The fiscal consolidation effort, undertaken over recent years, resulted in gradually reducing the size
of the general government's deficit from 7.4% of GDP in 1996 to an estimated 0.8% in 2000. Al-
though the fiscal outlook for 2001 is favourable, the government is running into difficulties realizing
the small surplus (0.5% of GDP) included in this year's budget.
At the public debt front the rate of decline has been slower. Despite the generation of large primary
surpluses in the state sector since 1996, the debt ratio declined only by 7.4 percentage points, from
111.3% of GDP in 1996 to 103.9% in 2000. The target of a quick decline over the next four years to
about 85% of GDP in 2004 appears presently rather optimistic but the downward trend in the debt
ratio is expected to strengthen in the following years, if the privatization programme has a significant
degree of success.
Output growth has not been accompanied by comparable employment growth. Employment has
increased by an average of 0.8% over the 1996-2000 period, while at the same time the labour force
increased by an average 1.3%. The combined result is a considerable increase in unemployment,
which reached the record level of 11.8% in 1999 and, according to provisional data, 11.3% in 2000.
Unemployment has become the major challenge for policy makers, and the immediate outlook is not
particularly bright as a substantial part of unemployment is considered to be of a structural character.
The recent labour market reform, introduced with a view to increase flexibility, has not produced any
positive results as yet. On the other hand participation rate is expected to continue rising. In con-
sequence, unemployment is forecast to decline very slowly in response to increased economic activity.
The current account deficit, which improved slightly in 1999 at 3.2% of GDP, has deteriorated in
2000, standing, according to the most recent estimates, at 4.4% of GDP on a national accounts basis.
This deterioration is partly the result of increased oil prices but reflects also the considerable increase
in the volume of non-oil imports (mainly capital equipment and non-durables) and has occurred
despite the satisfactory export performance particularly to non-EU countries. The picture is not ex-
pected to change in the course of the current and next year.
The most serious risk to the forecasts is the weakness of euro area growth. A further risk concerns
the longer-term sustainability of growth, which hinges as much on the success of structural reforms as
on sound financial policies. From the long unfinished agenda one item stands out as requiring the most
urgent attention, namely the social security system. The government is currently attempting to intro-
duce a major social security reform amidst strong opposition of labour unions.56
Country: Hungary Institute: GKI Co.
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Tendencies that started in the second half of last year continue in early 2001. Economic growth slows
down, the increase of demand accelerates, inflation does not decline, trade and current account bal-
ances deteriorate, and capital outflow continues. In the past years, the Hungarian economy managed to
achieve a growth rate 2 percentage points higher than in the EU. This difference is expected to persist,
and GDP growth will be probably close to 5% this year.
Imports expand faster than exports, although the latter increase dynamically, too. As a consequence,
trade deficit will be also high. Foreign trade turnover of custom-free zones will increase somewhat
faster than the average. A portion of the import increase serves investment purposes. The high trade57
deficit can already be detected in the current account balance. In the whole year, the external equi-
librium is expected to deteriorate, a current account deficit of 2.5 billion euro is expected.
Inflation in Hungary will decrease only to a small extent this year. Domestic energy prices—partly
in connection with their artificial stop last year—are still heading toward higher levels (for example
gas prices will rise by 12% this year but still remain below cost level). Agricultural and food prices
will probably increase further. Prices of consumer durables and clothes will rise, however, moderately.
The average price increase of the first half of the year will be around 9.8%, while that of the second
half will be approximately 8.2%.
Domestic demand will be strong, the growth of investments will be higher than in 2000, appr. 11%
in 2001. Real wages increase by about 4%, and household consumption by 5% due to a declining
savings rate. Budget deficit will be around 3.4% of GDP.
We expect that exchange rate policy will be changed at the end of this year or somewhat later when
the crawling peg will be abolished. Even if it were to serve anti-inflation policy, it would affect the
competitiveness of the Hungarian economy negatively and therefore priorities of economic policy
have to be changed in 2002 (election year) when the aspects of economic equilibrium would come to
the front.
Kopint-Datorg (April 10, 2001)
In 2000, the Hungarian economy developed dynamically. The 5.2% growth of GDP was driven, first
of all, by export-oriented industrial development. Gross industrial production increased by 18%, com-
modity exports in current euro terms by 30%. The driving force of this development was multinational
companies that continue to invest strongly in the country (most of new investment are "greenfield") in
spite of the fact that large-scale privatization had come to an end. More important than inflow of new
capital (FDI) into Hungary is the accumulation of assets of foreign-owned companies as a result of re-
investment of their profits. Domestically owned firms develop more modestly. As a consequence of
this development path, and the deterioration of the terms of trade by 2.7% in 2000 (GDI increased by
3.8% only), domestic incomes and domestic uses of GDP showed a more modest improvement than
that suggested by the indicators of production growth. Real wages increased by 1.5%, real incomes per
capita by 3%; and the growth rate of private consumption (about 3.5%) as well as that of investment
(6.5%) are clearly below the rate which was usually expected on the basis of the data about GDP and
industry (manufacturing). The inflation rate was unexpectedly high (9.8% measured as CPI) mostly
(but not exclusively) because of exogenous reasons. Domestic and external balances remained at a
satisfactory level. (Public sector deficit was smaller than planned.) The current economic situation still
seems to be promising for further growth, although external conditions are less favourable than last
year. Domestic demand has an increasing impact on GDP growth, partly because of the 'expansionist'
cycle of the economic policy (in May 2002, there will be parliamentary elections in Hungary).
Although external impacts do not increase the consumer price index as much as last year, inflation
remains high in the forecast period, especially because of the decreasing level of trust in government
inflation projections (i.e. stubbornly strong inflations expectations of households).58
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COMMENT: ESRI
Irish economic growth rates have defied most expectations by continuing to accelerate over the last
two years. Output growth in 2000 is estimated to be 10.5 per cent in real GDP terms, driven, in part,
by strong export growth and reinforced by buoyant domestic demand. The growth in output as
measured by real GNP is estimated to have reached a historical high of 9.8 per cent in 2000. Inflation
in consumer prices averaged 5.6 per cent in 2000, with the unemployment rate ending the year at 3.6
per cent. Against this exceptional performance, the prospects for output growth in 2001 and 2002 look
more modest, but are also much more uncertain.
The uncertainties arise from the prospects for the external environment given the rapid slowdown in
the United States and from the economic threat posed by the foot-and-mouth crises within Europe. Our
forecasts are predicated on the balance of probabilities that the US will experience a "soft landing",
with economic activity recovering in the latter part of 2001. We have taken a benign view on the
impact of the foot-and-mouth outbreak, assuming that it will be regionally confined and the contain-
ment measures will have their greatest impact over a duration of one quarter. Growth in 2001 is fore-
cast to be 6.7 per cent in real GDP and 6.1 per cent in real GNP terms. This revised forecast for 2001
reduces the growth rate by over half a percentage point. The growth prospects for 2002 are much more
susceptible to the extent and duration of the US slowdown. We forecast that output growth in 2002
will be 6.2 and 5.2 per cent in real GDP and real GNP terms, respectively. Inflation as measured by
the consumer price index is forecast to moderate to 4.2 per cent in 2001 and 3.6 per cent in 2002. The
unemployment rate is forecast to continue to decline this year to average 3.3 per cent and levelling off
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COMMENTS: PROMETEIA (April 2001)
In the second half of 2000 the Italian economy started to slow even if average figures for last year are
very favourable. The slowdown was mainly due to exports growth deceleration and, to a lesser extent,
to the deceleration of consumption and investment growth as a consequence of the oil shock and the
early signs of the deceleration in the US economy. Many indicators suggest that the slowdown
continues. The worsening of the international scene and the increased uncertainties, coming also from
the financial markets instability, are the main causes. Assuming that the international economy will
recover in the second half of the year, the economic growth is expected to improve also in Italy. How-
ever, the world recovery is expected to be slow and hence also 2002 figures will be affected: GDP is
likely to increase by 2.3% this year and 2.4% next year (2.9% in 2000).
Domestic demand growth should remain relatively sustained, since the budget policy is slightly
expansionary with its measures for households and firms, and labour market conditions should
continue to improve. Moreover, interest rates are low by historical standards, both in nominal and real
terms. On the contrary, net exports contribution to GDP growth will be negative in 2001 and 2002 due
to the marked slowdown of exports growth caused by the more moderate pace of world trade growth.
In recent years employment increased at a relatively fast rate (for instance, in January 2001 it was
3.2% higher than in the same month of 2000). It is expected to increase at a more moderate rate
reflecting the less favourable economic activity developments. However, the unemployment rate
should continue to decrease. It should be noted that in the northern regions it is already very low: 2.8%
for males and 6.3% for females.
The current account of the balance of payments registered a deficit in 2000 (the first since 1992)
due to the terms of trade losses (the non-oil trade surplus was stable). It should improve in 2001, main-
ly as a result of the oil price developments (it is expected to average around $25 per barrel).
In the first quarter inflation was higher than expected (it was 2.9%) because of marked increases in
food and services prices. The expected deceleration is based on the above mentioned assumptions
concerning the oil price and on the fact that the core inflation seems to have already reacted to the oil
shock (it gradually accelerated and now is around 2.5%). In 2002 the deceleration is likely to be rapid
mainly due to a statistical effect. It is worth noting that the inflation deceleration and the reduction of
inflation differential would be more rapid through the liberalization of several markets, especially in
the non-tradeable sectors.
In 2000 the public sector deficit / GDP ratio was 1.5% (excluding UMTS revenues) as indicated in
the 1999 Stability Program but slightly higher than expected more recently by the government (1.3%).
It is expected to decrease gradually in 2001 and 2002, but it seems unlikely to meet the Stability
Program targets (-0.8% and -0.5%, respectively), mainly because of a less sustained economic growth
(according to this document, GDP should increase by 2.9% in 2001 and 3.1% in 2002).62
IRS (April 2001)
The economy was growing at a good pace till the end of last year. Data for the first quarter still remain
satisfactory. However, leading indicators are rapidly deteriorating. The prospect is that of a slowdown
of the economy during the second half of the year, driven by the worsening export demand.
Specific factors are affecting the profile of the domestic demand. Private consumption is sustained
by the stimulus of the tax reductions and by the employment recovery that took place until the
beginning of this year. The expectations of further tax reduction are probably playing a role. However,
our estimates suggest that the public deficit this year is higher than the government target, and there
won't be any possibilities for further fiscal stimulus.
Firms at the beginning of the year seem to delay their investments, waiting for the fiscal reductions
expected by the next government (a new "Tremonti law"). Then, we expect a recovery of the invest-
ment demand during the second half of the year after a slowdown during the first two quarters. This
would be an exceptional behavior, as investments are supposed to move according to a counter-
cyclical profile. However, the risk is that these delayed investments won't be realized if the business
cycle worsens more than expected.
We expect that after the high growth rate of the fourth quarter 2000 (0.8 per cent according to
preliminary estimates), the growth in the first quarter will be at almost the same rate. This implies that,
despite a significant slowdown during the second half of this year, the average growth rate will remain
near 2.5 per cent.
Inflation will be reduced during this year for the energy and food products. At the end of the year
we are projecting an inflation rate at 2 per cent with a "core" inflation (excluding the food and energy
products) near 2.4 per cent.
ISAE (January 2001)
After the positive result of the fourth quarter of last year (when GDP accelerated and increased by
0.8% on a quarter-to-quarter basis), the Italian economy has registered a deceleration at the beginning
of 2001. Industrial production fell both in January and February, and the ISAE survey indicator on
business confidence, which has been diminishing since the last part of 2000, strongly deteriorated in
the first two months of 2001. The fall of entrepreneurs' confidence reflected a worsening of current
and future orders as well as less positive expectations on future trends of production. Some more
positive signs come from the consumers' confidence indicator that has been improving, with some
temporary interruptions, since last November: in March it achieved a value just below the favourable
average level attained during last summer.
Notwithstanding the deceleration of industrial activity, still positive news come from the labour
market: in January, employment kept on increasing and the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
fell below 10%. The improvement reflected better trends both in the North and in the South of Italy.
Inflation (measured on the basis of the national index of consumer prices) has been a bit higher than
expected in the first months of 2001. This has been caused by the lagged impact of the past oil price
increases and of the weak euro on final goods and services, compounded with the "mad-cow effect" on
food prices. However, the figure of March has showed a deceleration; expectations of operators (both
entrepreneurs and households) surveyed by ISAE point to a slowdown of inflation.
Given these trends, the Italian economy should register on average this year a deceleration of
growth (GDP should rise by about 2.4%, after having increased by 2.9% last year). The slowdown
basically reflects the deterioration of net exports, due to the world trade deceleration and the diminish-
ing of the stimulating effect of the euro depreciation. The deterioration of the net external demand
should only partly be compensated by a still positive domestic demand. The latter would be stimulated63
by the reduction of fiscal pressure on households and firms and by an improvement in the terms of
trade, coming from lower oil prices.
Employment is expected to continue to grow and the unemployment rate to further fall. As for
inflation, after the peak of the first quarter consumer prices should register a deceleration favoured by
the easing of external pressures. On average, the rate of increase of the national index could be 2.4% in
2001; the rate of increase in the Harmonised Index would be a little lower and stay at 2.2%.
CONFINDUSTRIA (April 2001)
According to ISTAT data for January and CSC survey for February and March, industrial production
stabilized in the first quarter on roughly the same level as in the last quarter of 2000. Business
confidence declined in the first months of the year, reflecting a slump of both domestic and foreign
orders; manufacturing firms registered also an increase in the level of inventories, which returned in
February above the level considered as "normal". On the other hand, consumers' confidence continued
to increase, reflecting the rise in employment level and the fall in unemployment, and returned in the
first quarter below the level of 10% (9.9% on a seasonally adjusted basis). Inflation reached 3% in
January and February, given the exceptional rise in food prices (related to the so-called "mad-cow"
disease) and the increase in public tariffs that concentrated at the beginning of the year. Inflation
returned to 2.8% in March, and we expect it to decline further in the next months, returning to around
2% by the end of the year; on this hypothesis, on average inflation will be around 2.5% in 2001.
We expect GDP to grow on average around 2.3%, somewhat slower than the EMU average (that we
estimate at 2.5%). External demand contribution to growth will be negligible or even slightly negative,
internal demand will continue to grow even if at a much slower rate with respect to last year (whose
rate of growth, net of a large negative inventories contribution, was equal to 3.1%); inventories will
give a slightly negative contribution to growth.64
Country: The Netherlands Institute: CPB
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COMMENT: CPB
In 2000 economic growth came out around 4% for the fourth successive year. For this year and next
the forecast for GDP growth is 3V4% in 2001 and 2%% in 2002. This cyclical downswing is due
primarily to a poorer export performance. Dutch non-energy merchandise export growth is expected to
come out at 5'/2 %, this means a halving compared with last year. The main reason is the loss of
momentum in the world economy. As a result of a slight improvement in external demand, the pro-
jection foresees some recovery in export growth next year. As they did last year, Dutch exporters will
lose market share to their international competitors in 2001 and 2002. The reasons for this are an un-
favourable export mix and production bottlenecks due to staff shortages. Next year the expected
deterioration in price competitiveness will also play a role. This is due to the projected appreciation in
the euro and the sharp rise in unit labour costs in Dutch manufacturing industry. Because of the
deteriorating competitiveness, industry will barely be able to benefit from the improvement in export
market growth. Re-exports will account for most of the acceleration in exports growth in 2002, and
this conceals the underlying loss of competitiveness.
Private consumption, by contrast, is expected to increase by AVz% in 2001, and will thus accelerate
compared to last year. Largely thanks to the considerable burden relief resulting from the recent tax
reform, real disposable household income will actually increase by as much as 5V4% this year. But be-
cause this purchasing power impulse will take some time to be translated into expenditure, con-
sumption growth will lag slightly behind income growth this year. Next year private consumption is
expected to grow by 414%. The increase in household wealth is expected to make a considerably
smaller contribution to private consumption growth this year and next compared to previous years.
The volume of business investment is expected to continue to expand in 2001 and 2002, but at a
slower pace compared to previous years. The staff shortages, higher real earnings growth and the on-
going process of product innovation will avert a decline in investment in response to the economic
slowdown. Consequently the investment ratio, i.e. the proportion of investment to output, should re-
main at the historically high level of last year.
Owing to a coincidence of circumstances, inflation is likely to accelerate from 2.6% last year to
around 4% this year. This is caused, firstly, by a number of government measures, including increases
in indirect taxes (especially value added tax and regulatory energy tax) from 1 January this year; and
secondly, by the acceleration in labour costs and the delayed passing on of last year's hike in import
prices. Many of the factors pushing up this year's inflation figure are of a temporary nature. Further-
more, the dollar's depreciation since late last year, which the projection assumes will continue to some
extent, and the weakening of world economic growth will lead to lower import prices this year and
next. The rise in the consumer price index is therefore expected to stay within 2% next year.
Not least as a result of the continuing tightness on the labour market, contractual pay rates are
expected to increase by 4% this year and by 3*4% next year, in both years above the change in the
consumer price index. Because of the lower growth rate, the projection shows an end to the long-
standing fall in unemployment. The unemployment rate will be stable at 3.5%.
The public finances will continue to develop favourably. On the revenue side this is reflected in a
big windfall, which will amount to more than 30 billion guilders next year. The public-sector EMU
balance is currently projected to come out between l-P/2% of GDP in 2001 and 2002. It should be
borne in mind here that the economic conditions during this period were highly favourable. The
cyclical component in GDP is estimated at Vz-\% in these years.66
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Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.67
COMMENT: STATISTICS NORWAY
2000 was a year of consolidation for the Norwegian economy. Growth in production and employment
was very moderate, and the economic boom of the last half of the 1990s ended. Cost inflation con-
tinued, but at a more moderate pace than in previous years even though unemployment was low and
some labour market segments were tight. Despite sharp growth in oil revenues, fiscal policy was
neutral while monetary policy shifted to a more contractionary stance. Surpluses in central government
accounts and the balance of payments were record high. Excluding the rise in energy prices and the
effect of exchange rate movements, price inflation remained moderate, partly because productivity
growth in the mainland economy picked up following a sluggish trend in recent years. In 2001 and
2002 the economy is expected to expand approximately on a par with trend growth. In spite of slightly
lower oil prices and a weaker dollar, the current account will show very high surpluses. Inflation will
gradually subside to a level that does not deviate substantially from the inflation rate among trading
partners. The same will be true for wage growth in 2002.68
Country: Poland Institute : IKCHZ
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Note: Figures for 2001 and 2002 are forecasts of the institute.
Source: OECD (2001); AIECE institutes.69
COMMENT: IKCHZ
The GDP growth in 2000 was lower than officially expected, but still more than 4 %. The economy
has shown some signs of slowing down since the second quarter of 2000.
Given the strong cyclical upturn in Western Europe, the economic growth in Poland has been driven
mainly by exports of manufactures. The rate of growth of industrial production more than doubled
from 3.6% in 1999 to 7.6% in 2000. With stronger import demand from Western Europe, export
growth has outpaced domestic demand which has remained subdued due to tight monetary policy. The
tightening of monetary policy (in particular the significant increases in interest rates in late 1999 and
twice in 2000) have had a negative impact on both fixed capital investment and private consumption
expenditures.
The major cause of the higher than expected inflation rate was the soaring world market prices of
crude oil and natural gas, which compounded by the strong appreciation of the dollar, led to frequent
increases in domestic fuel and utility prices. Together with higher import prices, rising food prices had
also contributed to inflationary pressures.
The labour market continued to worsen in 2000. The rise in unemployment was mainly due to a
wave of mass lay-off caused by restructuring in the coal mining, steel and textile industries. Rising
labour productivity has also reduced the demand for labour. The situation has been further aggravated
by the fact that a generation of the baby boom of the first half of the 1980s is now beginning to enter
the labour market. The tight monetary policy has also affected the demand for labour.
The foreign trade of Poland has recovered strongly after its slowdown in late 1998 and early 1999 in
the wave of the Russian crisis and a period of slow economic growth in the EU. The main boost to
export came from the EU. Strong import demand in Germany was particularly important.
During the last four years Poland has been running current account deficits on a scale which has
caused concern, but since the second half of 2000 it has started to diminish.
In face of the expected slowdown of economic growth and coming parliamentary elections the
short-term outlook for Poland is subject to many risks. The main external risk of the forecast is a trans-
mission of a possible "not so soft landing" of the US economy to the EU and then from the EU to
Poland. Main internal risks rise from unfavourable developments in the labour market and public
finance position. The massive unemployment has become a central economic problem the solution of
which requires a political consent and a wide spectrum of policy measures including a labour market
deregulation and an active fiscal policy pro-employment action.
Despite these challenges we expect that a better macroeconomic policy mix and a stronger position
of the government after the elections will make possible a smooth return to a sustainable and
satisfactory medium-term growth rate during 2002.70
Country: Slovenia Institute: SKEP
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COMMENT: SKEP
Very favourable international as well as domestic economic developments and promising business
surveys towards the end of 2000 suggested for Slovenia the possibility of even over 6 per cent GDP
growth for the year 2000, i.e. even higher than our previous forecasts. First calculations of the
National Statistical Office from the end of March this year pointed out the 4.8 % official growth rate
for 2000, so far. Strong export growth, above 11 % in real terms, assisted the fall of the current ac-
count deficit, despite the high increase in the world oil and commodity prices. The Slovenian economy
is doing well, with the exports proceeding to be the main driving force in the first months of 2001
again. In the light of the trends in the global economy the export is forecast to grow by 6.5% on
average in 2001. On the other hand, domestic demand will exceed the growth in 2000. After a quite
moderate 1.6% real wage growth in the last year, this year some more relaxed wage policy could bring
a 3-4 % wage increase, and other incomes are growing, too. Savings are also on the rise, especially
since the introduction of the national housing saving scheme. Extremely high investment growth, very
characteristic for Slovenia in past years, lost momentum in 2000. Nevertheless, it will come in line
with GDP growth in 2001, mainly because of investments in equipment. We forecast a 4.2 per cent
GDP growth in 2001. Our recent surveys from March 2001 on business expectations show that the
companies still believe in not very deteriorating overall business possibilities for the second half of
2001 compared to the first half of the year. Business confidence remains more or less stable and short-
term orders expectations have recently been still optimistic.
The inflation went up again during 2000, fed primarily by a rise in oil prices and some price
increases in domestic services. The inflation trends proceed in the first quarter of 2001, accompanied
by rising excise duties and prices in some sectors, where the state and local authorities still have the
dominant influence (energy, post, agriculture, transport...). Consequently, our present estimation
points out on at least 7.5 % of average inflation for the year 2001 and some 5.5 % for 2002. The
change at the top of the Bank of Slovenia will probably bring some more restrictive monetary policy
in coming months. The interest rates remain high and only a slight lowering in real rates is possible in
2001 and 2002. The reasons are still the relatively limited competition in the banking sector, the level
of liberalization and specifics of the financial sector in the small-sized economy. Fiscal policy is
somewhat relaxed in the present circumstances, and the budget for 2001 (delayed after the change in
government, before and after the election in last autumn), passing the Parliament in April, counts on a
1% deficit again. The labour market is expected to keep the trend of modest growth in employment
and to retain the level of the standardized unemployment rate at around 6.7%.72
Country: Spain Institute : SGEI - M°. de Economia
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COMMENT: MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA Y HACIENDA
En 2000 l'economie espagnole atteint une croissance du PIB autour de 4,0% pour la quatrieme annee
consecutive. En meme temps, le profil trimestriel montre un plafonnement de cette croissance pendant
le premier semestre aux alentours d'un maximum de 4,2% en glissement annuel, a partir duquel le
taux de croissance va decelerer se situant a 3,8% au dernier trimestre.
C'est bien a la demande interne qu'il faut attribuer cette deceleration de la croissance en cours
d'annee, autant a la consommation finale des menages que, surtout, a 1'investissement des entreprises
en biens d'equipement; alors que 1'investissement immobilier n'a subi qu'un leger ralentissement
pendant l'annee. Le secteur exterieur a pu beneficier de la forte poussee du commerce mondial, mais
beaucoup moins de la depreciation de l'euro, car plus des deux tiers des exportations espagnoles sont
destinees a 1'Union Europeenne.
C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut situer la nouvelle prevision pour 2001 revisee encore hier, selon
laquelle la croissance du PIB sera de 3,2%. La contribution du secteur exterieur etant identique a celle
de l'annee passee (c'est-a-dire legerement negative), la deceleration de la croissance de l'ordre d'un
point pourcent sera le resultat d'un ralentissement prononce de la consommation privee, son taux
d'augmentation n'etant que de 2,7%, c'est-a-dire 1,3 points inferieur a celui<=de 2000; alors que la
FBCF agregee subira aussi une legere perte de vitesse, son taux d'expansion de 5,3% sera inferieur
d'un peu plus d'un demi point a celui observe en 2000. Au total, la demande interne dans son
ensemble atteindra un rythme annuel de 3,3%; 0,8 points pourcent inferieur a celui enregistre l'annee
passee.
Sur le ralentissement de la consommation des menages (qui est le facteur principal de la revision a
la baisse de la croissance du PEB en 2001), plusieurs facteurs auront une incidence decisive. D'abord,
le rythme de creation nette d'emploi se situera juste au-dessus de 2%, alors qu'il etait de 3,3% en
2000. Mais, surtout on espere que les families vont tacher d'assainir leur position financiere apres leur
comportement tres depensier les dernieres annees; en particulier, son taux d'epargne est descendu a un
niveau tres bas en 2000, puisque leur consommation atteint presque 90 pourcent de leur revenu
disponible et qu'en meme temps leur investissement en logement augmentait a un rythme de 6,4%,
sans oublier la chute des valeurs boursieres a partir du printemps de 2000.
Le flechissement du rythme d'expansion de 1'investissement sera moindre. L'investissement des
entreprises en biens d'equipement plafonnait en 1998 avec un taux d'expansion de 13,4%; depuis lors
ce taux decroit, il devrait se situer au-dessous de 5% en moyenne annuelle en 2001, etant donnee
revolution escomptee de la demande interne et externe.
L'investissement dans le secteur du batiment devrait decelerer un peu seulement, puisque son
rythme de croissance serait encore de 5,7% cette annee. Car si le nombre de logements construits
diminue a la suite de leurs hausse de prix de 15% l'annee passee, la construction non-residentielle
viendrait le compenser.
La faible contribution du secteur exterieur a la croissance du PIB (-0,1 pourcent) cache une
deceleration des exportations et des importations autour de 2,5 points chacune, par rapport a 2000.
Celle des exportations tiendrait a la moindre poussee du commerce mondiale (encore que les
exportations espagnoles sont relativement abritees, etant donnee leurs destination majoritaire a l'TJE).
Celle des importations serait induite par le flechissement du rythme d'expansion de la demande
interne.74
Country: Sweden Institute: INDUSTRIFORBUNDET
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COMMENT: INDUSTRIFORBUNDET
Last year concluded in sharp contrast to the way it started. While the year opened with accelerating
growth on global markets, its conclusion came to be dominated by fears that the global economy was
weakening. In an economy such as the Swedish, with exports accounting for almost 50 per cent of the75
aggregate volume of goods and services produced (GDP), it is inevitable that such a change in our
external markets will have a major effect. However, it was no surprise that the global economy was
about to cool off. A series of interest rate increases in the USA, the EU and elsewhere were, after all,
intended to moderate economic growth in order to prevent inflation from rising.
The abruptness and speed of the economic downswing surprised many people, not least in-
dustrialists themselves. The gap between the expected order intake and the actual one in manu-
facturing industry in Sweden has been widening dramatically ever since last summer. This means that
many companies have drawn up plans for their business on the basis of a stronger demand situation
than what actually eventuated. The level of orders booked was a major disappointment, particularly
during the fourth quarter of 2000, even though companies had already lowered their expectations. This
resulted in rising stocks, largely involuntary.
Companies are now being compelled not only to adjust their production to the lower level of
demand but also to reduce their stocks. Admittedly, it was not until quite recently that the many profit
warnings and lowered expectations began to provide an unambiguous picture, but in actual fact, the
slowdown in the industrial economy could have been observed as long ago as last summer in one set
of statistics or another. The sectors of industry that are normally affected first in^the classic industrial
cycle—raw materials and intermediate goods—began to come up against steadily weakening growth
in demand almost one year ago. Rates of production in these industries have also been successively
lowered. Even though manufacturing industry now accounts for around 20 per cent of the aggregate
value added in the Swedish economy, by virtue of its size as a buyer of corporate services and such
like, it is a very important component of the economy.
In contrast to the recession caused by the crisis in Asia, this time there is no other strong growth
factor driving the Swedish economy. During the Asia crisis, IT companies in particular expanded in
the services sector to full effect, and successfully bridged over the weakness of the industrial economy.
According to preliminary figures, mining and manufacturing output rose by 6.7 per cent in 2000. This
year, we expect production to grow by a moderate 2.8 per cent. Around half of the increase can be
contributed to a positive so-called overhang from 2000. The stabilization of the global economy
during the autumn, followed by rising demand, will stimulate growth in 2002, and generate an increase
of some 3.5 per cent in industrial output. Our preliminary estimates show that GDP expanded by
3.7 per cent last year. Almost 1 percentage point of this upswing can be explained by the strong con-
tribution of stocks. Exports rose by almost 10 per cent. A return to an import demand that was more
normal for the Swedish economy led to an increase of 11 per cent in imports. Consequently, a positive
contribution of foreign trade of almost 1 percentage point in 1999 was converted into a small negative
contribution last year. The negative trend is expected to continue this year. GDP growth will slacken
to 2.5 per cent in 2001. Despite rising final domestic demand, destocking will lower the growth rate by
almost 0.5 percentage points. One important factor behind the estimated increase in domestic demand
is the rising level of capital formation. In manufacturing industry, for example, the substantial
investments planned in the transport equipment industry and the pulp and paper industries will raise
the level of capital investment for the year. In the business sector, excluding manufacturing, the
installation of the UMTS network will get going in 2001. We estimate that around one-third of the
investments that this project will require between now and 2003 will be made in 2001. The
international recovery expected in 2002 will stimulate exports slightly, while the more moderate rate
of capital formation will tend to hold down import demand slightly; GDP is expected to grow by
2.6 per cent.76
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COMMENT: KOF
The Swiss economy's performance in 2000 was unmistakably heartening. Gross domestic product
registered its strongest growth since 1990. The main distinguishing features last year were the more
vigorous aggregate domestic demand compared to 1999, strong growth in exports of goods, a
tightening of monetary screws up to the mid-year point, only a gentle rise in inflation induced by
cyclical economic effects despite the robust growth in the economy, and a further marked reduction in
the labour market disequilibrium.
The combination of trends on individual GDP components resulted in GDP expanding by 3.0% year
over year in 2000 (1999: +1.5%). Full-time-equivalent employment rose by 1.5%, compared to 0.7%
in 1999. The increase in job vacancies on offer last year worked out considerably smaller than the ex-
pansion in employment itself, thereby further reducing the labour market disequilibrium. The unem-
ployment rate dropped from 2.7% to 2.0%. The national consumer price index (CPI) showed annual
inflation averaging 1.6% in 2000, which is more or less double the rate registered in 1999. Despite this
acceleration, inflation in Switzerland remained below the ceiling of 2.0% set by the SNB for main-
taining price stability. The underlying core rate of inflation as computed by KOF/ETH—which is
better suited to assessing inflation trends prompted by cyclical economic effects' than the headline
CPI—realized out at 0.7%. This noticeably lower underlying rate compared to the headline CPI
indicates that Switzerland experienced only comparatively muted cyclical inflationary pressures last
year, despite the robust growth registered by the economy.
The framework of economic policy underpinning the forecast for 2001/2002 is sketched out as
follows: Last year, the SNB consistently tightened its monetary policy as it saw fit until the middle of
the year, thereby giving it the latitude to switch to a watching brief from the second half of the year
onwards. This year, the SNB decided to lower its target range slightly for the reference 3-month
LIBOR in late March, based on its belief that inflationary risks in Switzerland were receding. Owing
to Switzerland's close external economic ties with the EU, the SNB is only likely to allow the Swiss
franc to edge up a fraction against the euro in the coming couple of years. We would expect that the
SNB will make a further move to ease its current monetary restrictiveness in the second half of the
year as the output gap begins to widen a little again.
The outlook for public sector finances (government and social security scheme) is favourable for
the next two years. We would expect to see surpluses on the accounts for both the social welfare
scheme and government authorities. Overall though, the combined surplus is unlikely to be as large as
it was in 2000. For the 2001/2002 forecasting period, the income ratio is likely to fall whilst the policy
on spending should be geared towards ongoing containment of expenditure. The public spending ratio
will, therefore, decline a little. Given this scenario, the structural balance on government finances will
be lower than the sizeable surplus booked in 2000. Nevertheless, public sector finances will still show
a surplus.
On the domestic economy front, several factors will hamper growth. Rates of increase in all
constituents of aggregate domestic demand, with the sole exception of public sector consumption, will
decline over the forecasting period. The driving forces on the domestic economy front are set to lose
power over the 2001-2002 forecasting period even though a growth rate of a just under 2% remains
reasonably robust. The momentum from the foreign trade front will also fade quite noticeably. Growth
rates for both total exports and total imports will be lower than last year. The net impact on GDP for
the current year from foreign trade (excluding precious metals and gems) will be negative whereas it
should be neutral in 2002. Overall, GDP growth is likely to slacken to 2.1% in 2001 and 1.6% in 2002.
A look at how growth rates are likely to change during the course of the year reveals that they are
likely to display a fairly consistent pattern this year. As from early next year, however, the annualized
year-over-year growth rates will dip a little before levelling off at just under 1.4%. GDP growth will,
therefore, be running at a solid tempo for the Swiss economy.78
This year, employment (recalculated on a full-time-equivalent basis) will rise by 1.4% on the back
of 2.1% GDP growth. In the coming year, with GDP growth forecast to rise by 1.6%, employment is
likely to rise by just 0.7%. The projected expansion in employment for 2001 and 2002 will help to
offset the rise in jobs being offered. The labour market disequilibrium will, therefore, diminish in both
years. The rate of decline will, however, steadily ease as from mid-2002, leaving the labour market
disequilibrium almost unchanged. The registered jobless rate can be expected to work out at an annual
average of 1.5% in 2001 and 1.3% in 2002. Over the next couple of years, the anticipated fall in crude
oil prices will help to bring down the rate of imported inflation. Over the forecasting period, the
annual average increase in the national CPI is expected to reach 1.2% in 2001 and 1.0% in 2002, as
opposed to 1.6% last year. This clearly shows that there are no immediate inflationary dangers lurking
on our 2001/2002 forecasting horizon.Country: United Kingdom
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COMMENT: NESR
The economy over recent periods has been impacted by a number of short-term supply shocks, namely
the disruption on the railways and the foot-and-mouth disease, along with a slowdown in world
demand emanating from the US. This has served to lower forecasts of growth for this year relative to
where they -would have been 6 months ago. Over the medium term the slowdown in private demand is
expected to be replaced to some degree by the announced increases in government demand, most
noticeably government investment. The value of sterling has also impacted disproportionately on the
traded sector of the economy over recent times. Sterling is forecast to weaken over the next few years,
easing such pressures. The depreciation in sterling provides one of the main upward influences on
inflation in the forecast.